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Mart́ın López-Daneri, Assistant Professor, Economics Department, Temple University
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMICS WITH HETEROGENEITY
AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Copyright c©





On the academic front, I am deeply grateful to my advisor Dirk Krueger and the
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMICS WITH HETEROGENEITY
AND PUBLIC FINANCE
André Victor Doherty Luduvice
Dirk Krueger
This thesis focuses on how the design of public insurance policies entails distribu-
tional consequences that impact macroeconomic aggregates, inequality, and welfare.
The first chapter assesses the general equilibrium effects of substituting the current
U.S. income security system with a Universal Basic Income (UBI) policy. I develop
an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic income risk that incorporates
intensive and extensive margins of labor supply, on-the-job learning, and child-bearing
costs. I calibrate the model to the U.S. and conduct counterfactual analyses that
implement reforms towards a UBI. I find that an expenditure-neutral reform has
moderate impacts on agents’ labor supply response but induces aggregate capital and
output to grow due to larger precautionary savings. A UBI of $1,000 monthly requires
a substantial increase in the tax rate of consumption used to clear the government
budget and lead to an overall decrease in the aggregates. In both cases, the economy
has more disposable income but less consumption at the bottom of their distributions.
The UBI economy constitutes a welfare loss at the transition if expenditure-neutral
vii
and results in a gain in the second scenario. Despite relative losses, a majority of
newborn households support both UBI reforms.
The second chapter develops a heterogeneous agents model with history-dependent
U.I. benefits built on stylized facts of the U.S. economy to quantitatively obtain an
optimal U.I. program design. We first conduct an empirical analysis using the dis-
continuity of U.I. rules at state borders and find that a tenure requirement induces
a longer employment spell. The monetary requirement decreases the number of em-
ployers and has a stronger effect on U.I. applications. The model can recover the sign
of the relation between the requirements and the employment outcomes. When the
tenure requirement is long, workers tend to accept more low paying jobs to become
eligible sooner to U.I. and protect themselves from risk. The monetary requirement
has the opposite effect. Due to its impact on moral hazard, the monetary require-
ment can generate higher levels of welfare than an increase in the length of the tenure
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Chapter 1
The Macroeconomic Effects of
Universal Basic Income Programs
by André Victor Doherty Luduvice†
1.1 Introduction
A Universal Basic Income (UBI) is an unconditional transfer given to all citizens of a
given region or country. In the last few years, pilot programs and experiments have
been proposed, launched, or are ongoing in countries such as Canada, Brazil, Finland1,
Kenya, Switzerland, Uganda, and the United States2. The idea is far from new in
Economics as similar concepts have been proposed by James Meade, Milton Friedman
- with the Negative Income Tax -, Anthony Atkinson, among others (Meade, 1935;
†University of Pennsylvania.
1The Finnish experiment has already been concluded. The program ran through 2017-18 and the
preliminary results for the first year can be found in the recently released report (link).
2A few examples are the Y Combinator randomized control trial, the Stockton Economic Em-
powerment Demonstration in California, and the democratic candidate Andrew Yang’s ”Freedom
Dividend” proposal. A longstanding program of unconditional transfers in the U.S. is the Alaska
Permanent Fund Dividend, which will be later discussed in detail in this text.
1
Friedman, 1962; Atkinson, 1995) and has been long discussed by thinkers across all
traditions of the political spectrum (Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). In a nationwide
context, the span of proposed policies is fairly broad: from large, one-time grants at
the beginning of working age on top of the already existing programs to an entire
substitution of the welfare system, including Social Security (SS) and health benefits
(Murray, 2006; Thigpen, 2016).
The return of the UBI concept to the policy debate and, more recently, to the
Economics literature, is due to both the economic incentives intrinsic to its simple
design and to the recent set of trends in inequality, public finance and the labor
market that have been attracting Economists’ attention. On the incentives side, the
UBI can potentially reduce inefficiencies at the microeconomic level. First, as it is
a lump-sum transfer, it does not distort individuals’ decisions and avoid threshold
traps that might be induced by any means-testings. Second, it is untargeted and can
yield a 100% take-up rate as it avoids stigma or any other latent frictions for program
eligibility and applications. Third, it does not require any monitoring or bookkeeping
and can reduce government operational costs.
In the last 20 years, there has been a steady growth of both federal spending and
participation in means-tested income security programs such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The
eligibility requirements of such programs yield phase-out effects that generate discon-
tinuities in after-tax income with effective marginal tax rates on the order of 30-39%,
for more than 50% of low- and moderate-income households (CBO, 2013; CBO, 2015).
At the same time, income inequality has sharply risen as the top 1% household earns
today 24.1 times the median household income, a figure that was 8.6 in 1976 (Naka-
jima, 2017). While such growth of the very top is often addressed by the literature,
the catching-up of the bottom when accruing its share of national income is a re-
2
distribution matter in which the UBI is often raised as a competitive instrument.
Finally, the observed decline of labor force participation, especially among young
men, when paired with the current and expected rise of automation, has triggered
the concern on how to adapt the welfare system in an economic environment with
pervasive joblessness (Michaels, 2017; Lowrey, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019).
However, as in any reform proposal, UBI-type programs gather significant draw-
backs that raise skepticism towards both the effectiveness and the feasibility of its
implementation (Ravaillon, 2018; Kearney and Mogstad, 2019). On top of the list
of concerns is its potential large cost due to its universality and how it would be
financed. Questions are raised regarding possible taxation counterparts that could be
similarly as distortionary as means-testing thresholds or whether it could crowd-out
the budget from other programs directed to poverty alleviation. A second concern is
its potential disincentive to work due to large income effects, especially at the bot-
tom of the income distribution, which leans the balance towards the need for work
requirements in the EITC fashion. Lastly, there is the natural economic intuition of
equating marginal utilities behind economic redistribution. The UBI is thus often
argued as not intrinsically designed to generate equity since it pays same benefits to
the rich and the poor.
This paper assesses the effects of substituting the current income security share of
the U.S. welfare system for a UBI. Despite the growing momentum of the debate and
the many unanswered questions, the macroeconomic literature still lacks a detailed
understanding of what would be the general equilibrium, distributional and welfare
effects of a large scale reform of the welfare system that implements a UBI. More
specifically, what would be expected of the labor supply and accrual of disposable
income for different strands of the distribution in such reconstruction and its overall
effect on inequality. In order to tackle this task, I numerically solve a dynamic gen-
3
eral equilibrium model that is able to provide micro-founded life-cycle and budgetary
implications of such a broad welfare state reform as well as a normative assessment
that relies on rich dynamics and heterogeneity taking into account the overall impact
on inequality. With respect to the literature, this work is on the tradition of evalu-
ating reforms and transfer programs in heterogeneous agents models (Lopez-Daneri,
2016; Pashchenko and Porapakkarm, 2017; Wellschmied, 2020; Ortigueira and Siassi,
2019; Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura, 2019a; Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura, 2019b;
Hannusch, 2019; Berriel and Zilberman, 2011) and is an addition from the quantita-
tive macroeconomics side to a growing list of recent studies that focus on the UBI
policy (Jones and Marinescu, 2018; Hanna and Olken, 2018; Banerjee, Niehaus, and
Suri, 2019; Ghatak and Maniquet, 2019; Hoynes and Rothstein, 2019; Daruich and
Fernandez, 2020).
I develop a large-scale overlapping generations model with retirement and het-
erogeneity across households that incorporates both intensive and extensive margins
of labor supply, human capital accumulation through labor market experience, and
child-bearing costs. Households are also heterogeneous with respect to estimated
permanent ability and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The model has a welfare
system composed of Social and Income Security (henceforth IS and SS systems) that
mimics the U.S. structure accounting for means-testing requirements and its taxa-
tion counterparts. The IS system is composed of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), means-tested transfers such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP), the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI), the latter only available through retirement. The
SS system is budget-balanced and pays retirement benefits to all households in the
economy. I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, and with this macroeconomic
toolkit, I conduct counterfactual analyses of implementing reforms in the welfare
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system towards a UBI and evaluate the welfare implications of means-tested versus
unconditional transfers.
In order to bring this model to the data, I estimate a wage process taking into
account the target population of cash transfers recipients using the 2008 panel of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in a similar fashion to Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2010) and calibrate parameters to match data moments.
The model can successfully replicate both the non-targeted earnings and wealth dis-
tribution of the U.S due to a combination of the steepness of the earnings profile
of high productivity households via human capital accumulation and the means-
testing transfer schedule. In a further step, I conduct a counterfactual exercise in
the model environment designed to approximate the effects of the Alaska Permanent
Fund dividend. As empirically shown in Jones and Marinescu (2018), this program
has macroeconomic outcomes, and the model is able to, in an off-sample fashion,
generate aggregate responses that are in the same sign an order of magnitude of the
ones estimated. Moreover, by disentangling partial and general equilibrium effects,
I show that the model requires the latter and the adjustment of labor supply to the
change in the competitive wage to better match the evidence in the data.
The first counterfactual I implement is an expenditure-neutral reform that keeps
constant the total amount of budget outlays in transfers and let the tax rate on
consumption endogenously adjust to balance the government’s budget. The aggregate
response encompasses an increase of 6% in physical capital with an accompanying
decrease in the equilibrium interest rate. The result is driven by agents that, early
in their life-cycle, are at the bottom of the wealth distribution in the benchmark
scenario and now save more due to the absence of means-testing and the average level
of transfers in the counterfactual economy. Pushed by an increase in the aggregate
capital, output increases by 4%. The income effect generated by the transfers affects
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the aggregate labor market inducing a small increase in total hours, reflecting the
rise in the intensive margin of releasing households from the incentive to work less
in order to fall inside the means-testing brackets. At the same time, the extensive
margin reacts in the opposite direction with a decrease of labor force participation
of 1 percentage point. This reform reduces the tax effort towards revenues as the
endogenous tax rate on consumption decreases from 6.7% to 5.7%.
In my second counterfactual exercise, I implement a UBI reform similar to the one
proposed by Andrew Yang - Democratic presidential candidate for the 2020 elections
in the US. I let the level of aggregate transfers be the equivalent of 20% of output in
the benchmark economy. This yields a transfer of approximately US$12,000 annually
to each household in the economy. In this scenario, - and not surprisingly - the tax
rate on consumption needs to increase 32 percentage points in order to balance the
government’s budget. The aggregate response of the economy is a contraction of both
capital and output, stemming simultaneously from the drop in hours, the decline in
labor force participation, and the decrease of precautionary savings motive at the
bottom generated by the high level of the consumption floor. In terms of the impact
on inequality, the second UBI reform increases the Gini coefficient for pre-tax earnings
and wealth, mostly due to the selection mechanism arising from the high productivity
agents that remain in the labor force and can buffer consumption through a higher
level of savings. However, inequality in disposable income at the very bottom of the
distribution decreases in both cases, driven by a reduction of the means accrued by the
middle-class. This result is followed by less consumption redistribution towards the
same bottom 20% in both economies, which is reshufflled towards the middle-class.
I also conduct a normative analysis of the reforms by evaluating the model’s re-
sponses in welfare. Under a utilitarian Social Welfare Function, the Consumption
Equivalent Variation required for the UBI alternative to attain the same level of
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welfare of the current system at the beginning of the life-cycle is of -0.24%. Al-
ternatively, the generous UBI transfer improves welfare by 1.22%. The transitional
dynamics towards the generous UBI economy exhibits differences in welfare relative
to the steady-state levels due to the sharp drop in labor coupled with a slow adjust-
ment in capital. The decomposition of welfare at the age dimension shows that the
welfare losses in the first counterfactual scenario are more pronounced during earlier
ages, as households that have children receive lower transfers when compared to the
ones of the means-tested system, which includes the different brackets per children
of the EITC. The second reform has gains across all generations alive at the period
of the reform. Both counterfactuals can constitute a majority of winners that would
vote in favor of the reform. The share of winners closely tracks the age breakdown,
with approval of 80.4% for the second proposal. Moreover, the first counterfactual is
beneficial to high ability households, while the second counterfactual is preferred by
the ones with low ability.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present a review of the
related literature. In Section 2.4, I construct the setting of my quantitative model,
provide intuition about the underlying theory, and define the recursive competitive
equilibrium. In the subsequent Section 2.5, I describe the calibration used to map
the model to the data. Section 2.6 presents the results for the Benchmark Economy
and the properties of the initial steady-state. Section 1.6 lays-out the quantitative
exercises explored and the results for two counterfactual UBI reforms. In Section 1.7,
I explore the results for the transitional dynamics between the initial steady-state and
the final steady-state of the reforms. Section 1.8 conducts the normative evaluation




I begin by briefly discussing the empirical evidence on the labor market effect of un-
conditional transfers. In a comprehensive summary, Marinescu (2017) documents the
empirical findings of related experiments such as the NIT, casino dividends recipients,
and lottery winners. She observes that overall, in such programs, there is either no
effect on labor market supply or a slight but not statistically significant reduction in
work and earnings. For the case of Permanent Fund, one of the few clear examples
of windfall transfers in a wide geographic region, Jones and Marinescu (2018) use a
synthetic control method and find that the dividend cash transfer had no effect on
the employment to population ratio and increased part-time work by 1.8 percentage
point, suggesting a close to zero income effect for the extensive margin. In section
1.5.3, I will refer to these estimates and use them as a validation of the general equilib-
rium effects of my model. I include below other relevant measurements that, though
not used explicitly in this paper, are also relevant for the underlying debate of the
distinction between macro and micro labor supply responses to transfers.
A small response of labor supply is also confirmed by a windfall cash transfer pro-
gram held in Iran that substitutes energy subsidies and reaches more than 70 million
citizens, yielding a take-up rate of about 95%. The evidence is in Salehi-Isfahani
and Mostafazi-Dehzooei (2018) who analyze a rich panel of households and find no
discernible negative labor supply effect, both on hours or labor force participation,
with positive otucomes for women and self-employed men. In the opposite direction,
a study by Giupponi (2019) on welfare transfers based on spouse’s death uses Italian
administrative data to estimate the income effect of losing the benefit. She estimates
a marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income of approximately -1.0, indicat-
ing a larger response than the previously observed in the literature. Lastly, a recent
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evidence by Egger et al. (2019) estimates behavioral and general equilibrium impacts
of large cash transfers in rural villages in Kenya. Authors do not observe meaningful
changes in the labor supply of treated households, with increase in spending and a
local fiscal multiplier of 2.5.
The long-term effect of transfers is estimated by Price and Song (2017) for the par-
ticipants in the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, a program inspired
by the NIT proposal. Following adults for over four decades using Social Security
data, authors find that the treatment decreased earned income during the experi-
ment, caused no significant effect immediately after it, and decreased earnings later
in life. In the paper, the authors argue that the latter arises due to the interaction of
a stronger preference for leisure in older ages and extra accumulated wealth. On the
other hand, while further confirming the small labor supply evidence, but suggesting
that it does not change at older ages, Cesarini et al. (2017) study the wealth effect
of lottery prizes in Sweden. Authors find that winners slightly reduce earnings being
persistent and similar by age, education, and sex.
Turning to akin settings to my quantitative model, Fabre, Pallage, and Zimmer-
mann (2014) is an early work where authors compare the welfare effects of unem-
ployment insurance (UI) against the UBI finding that the former is socially robust
to the introduction of the latter. Despite drawbacks embedded in UI, such as moral
hazard and government monitoring costs, the authors argue that it would take em-
pirically implausible values for the parameters associated with these costs to make a
UBI socially preferred. The main reason is that, in the mechanism proposed under
incomplete markets, the UI insures agents in states of the world when they need the
most. Lopez-Daneri (2016) is a key reference to our proposed framework as it studies
a revenue-neutral reform of the U.S. income tax and welfare system to an NIT. The
author calibrates a life-cycle model to the U.S. economy with welfare payments in a
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non-linear function of income and a lump-sum payment of retirement benefits. Fo-
cusing on an equilibrium with transitional dynamics for an open economy, the author
finds that the optimal NIT imposes a 22% marginal tax rate and a transfer of 11%
of GDP of the benchmark economy with an ex-ante welfare gain of 2.1%.
In a working paper, Ortigueira and Siassi (2019) develop a structural dynamic
model with a rich system of means-tested, anti-poverty transfers where households
make not only the standard consumption and savings decisions but also family for-
mation and program participation. Authors find in their model that lone mothers
have large incentives to work, with low-productive ones receiving, on average, a par-
ticipation subsidy amounting to 15% of their labor earnings. Also, asset testing and
eligibility to programs such as the SNAP or TANF introduce substntial distortions in
low -productive workers’ savings decisions, a point discussed in detail in Wellschmied
(2020). In the context of Medicaid, Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2017) show that
assets-testing can reduce labor supply distortions in an environment with unobserved
productivity. More recently, Daruich and Fernandez (2020) provide a general equilib-
rium approach to a UBI reform with focus on skill investments during early childhood.
My paper adds to this literature by framing a policy scenario of a reform towards
a UBI as a substitution of the IS system. Moreover, I follow Ortigueira and Siassi
(2019) and Wellschmied (2020) and extend the standard modeling framework to ex-
plicitly outline the IS system and the many brackets for the different means-testing
requirements in an overlapping generations economy. A novel part consists of the in-
teraction of such a system with the operative extensive and intensive margins of labor
supply modeled as in Chang et al. (2019), which yields a mechanism that allows me
to understand the trade-off of both margins under the different policies. I account for
human capital accumulation based on labor market experience as in Attanasio, Low,
and Sanchez-Marcos (2008), Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2019a), Guner, Kay-
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gusuz, and Ventura (2019b), and Hannusch (2019), and combine all such ingredients
in a general equilibrium framework taking into account the transitional dynamics.
The equilibrium component can be understood as complementary to the approach
in dynamic structural models of labor supply, such as in Marc K. Chan (2013), to
the approach in public economics in Saez (2002), Brewer, Saez, and Shephard (2008),
and Rothstein (2010), and other ones reviewed by Mark K. Chan and Moffitt (2018).
As the interest in the Universal Basic Income has been sharply growing in the last
few years, there is a set of recent papers that study the UBI phenomenon through
different perspectives. Hanna and Olken (2018) use data from Indonesia and Peru
to analyze the trade-offs involved in proxy targeting versus universal basic income.
Banerjee, Niehaus, and Suri (2019) draw from the evidence of cash transfer programs
in developing countries to anticipate the potential effects of a UBI as an incremental
policy focused on poverty mitigation. Ghatak and Maniquet (2019) develop and
study a theoretical framework to assess the normative justifications of a UBI system.
Finally, and in close relation to the scope of this paper, Hoynes and Rothstein (2019)
study the role of UBIs in advanced economies with a descriptive framework that
encompasses different policy designs. They forecast that a UBI would direct larger
transfers to childless and middle-income rather than poor households. The main
contribution of this paper from the perspective of this literature is thus to add a
macroeconomic framework that can serve as a quantitative laboratory to assess the
impact of a nationwide reform of the welfare system and deliver precise predictions
to many of the unanswered questions raised in the papers.
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1.3 The Model
This section describes the dynamic general equilibrium model I use to analyze the
macroeconomic effects of a reform of the welfare system in the U.S. towards a Univer-
sal Basic Income. The environment is a life-cycle, overlapping generations economy
with incomplete markets and individual heterogeneity, endogenous labor supply, hu-
man capital accumulation, and a tax and transfers system similar to the one of the
U.S.
Households are heterogeneous with respect to their age, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}, permanent
ability, θ ∈ Θ, idiosyncratic productivity shock, z ∈ Z, human capital stock, h ∈ H,
and asset holdings a ∈ A. I also model an extra degree of heterogeneity in the family
structure by allowing households to differ on child-bearing as it is one of the key
determinants for the allocation within the U.S. tax code, thus keeping track of whether
households are child-bearers or not, k ∈ K = {0, 1}. The state space of the economy
is then the set S = A×H×Z×K×Θ×{1, . . . , J}. In the subsections below, I discuss
in detail every entry of the individual state space element s = (a, h, z, k, θ, j) ∈ S.
As the environment is set with the the underlying purpose of assesing a reform
of the transfer system that will be analyzed both in steady-states and along the
transition, throughout the description of the model, I will selectively omit indices in
order to avoid loading the notation. More specifically, I will denote all individual
variables as defined over the individual state-space s, hence age-dependent and thus
implicitly indexed by j. However, they should also be understood as implicitly indexed
by time t. As the aggregate variables are more naturally understood to be time-
dependent, I will explicitly index them by t.
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1.3.1 Demographics
Each model period stands for one year. Time t is discrete with infinite horizon and
the economy is populated by a continuum of mass one of households who live at most
J years. There is uncertainty regarding the time of death in every age j = 1, . . . , J
so that the household faces probability ψj of surviving to age j. Therefore, in every
period, a fraction of the household population dies and leaves accidental bequests q.
The age profile of the population {µt}Jj=1 is modeled by assuming that the fraction of






j=1 µj = 1, and where gn is the population growth rate.
I assume that the household does not decide the number of children or when to
have them in a similar fashion to Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008). At
every period t, a fraction pk of the households is defined to have children during
their life-cycle, and are then flagged by k = 1. When they do so, they all have
simultaneously the same number of children which solely depends exogenously on
their age. Households have a number of kids nk,j at age j who are born in working
ages ji, with i ∈ I, where I is finite. I also assume that children live in the household
until they are 18 years old3. Given this structure, by knowing age j and the different







ji ≤ j ≤ ji + 17
]
. (1.1)
Households with children pay a child-care cost η whenever they are working with
any young children in the household, defined to be between zero and two years old.
3Here I follow the same interpretation of Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) used in
Fehr and F. Kindermann (2018).
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At the aggregate level, I define the sum of such costs as CCt.
1.3.2 Preferences
Households have a time-separable period utility function, maximize their discounted
expected lifetime utility from nondurable goods consumption c and labor supply l. It














where β is the discount factor and E is the expectation operator.
1.3.3 Technology
There is a single good produced in this economy with technology given by a Cobb-
Douglas production function that exhibits constant returns to scale, Y = F (Kt, Lt) =
Kαt L
1−α
t , where α ∈ (0, 1) is the output share of capital income and Yt, Kt and Lt
denote, respectively, aggregate output, physical capital and labor. The final good can
be consumed or invested in physical capital on a one-to-one basis.
The price of the consumption good is normalized to one and aggregate investment
in physical capital, It, is defined by the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + It, (1.3)
where δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
This technology is used by a representative firm that behaves competitively max-
imizing profits at every period t by choosing labor and capital given factor prices.
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t − wtLt − (rt + δk)Kt. (1.4)













1.3.4 Endowments and Labor Income
Agents are born with zero assets, endowed with one unit of time, and forcefully retire
at age JR. While working, individual wage depends on the competitive wage wt, a
permanent ability shock θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ), human capital level hj, and an idiosyncratic
persistent shock zj.
I assume that households can only choose their hours within the set [0, 1] and are
subject to a non-convexity associated with set-up costs for work - such as commuting
time - as in Chang et al. (2019). I define then `(l) to be the effective hours of work
and use the following functional form to account for this effect:
`(l) = max
{
0, l − l̄
}
, l ∈ [0, 1], (1.7)
where l is the individual labor supply and 0 < l̄ < 1.
The function in (1.7) above imposes a wedge in the mapping between chosen
hours and labor earnings and it gives rise to adjustments along the extensive and
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intensive margins as in Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius (2009). It can also be
understood in the same fashion as the non-linearity of such mapping in Erosa, Fuster,
and Kambourov (2016).
Moreover, this formulation is particularly suited to the nature of this paper’s
question, which calls for precise predictions about the behavior of the labor supply
and allows sharp distinctions between participation and movements through part-
time and full-time work4. This characterization is useful later in the validation of the
model in section 1.5.3.
Households pre-tax labor income is then defined by:
y(l, hj, zj) = w · exp(θ) · exp(zj) · hj · `(l) (1.8)
I follow the approach used in Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and
Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2019a) and Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2019b)
and assume that the human capital component evolves according to a law of motion
that takes into account the increasing return on wage due to labor market experience:
hj+1 = H(hj, l, j; ν, δh) = exp
[





where ν1 captures the positive effect of working, ν2 is the diminishing marginal return
of the incremental year in the labor force, and δh stands for the depreciation rate of
the human capital stock when out of the labor force5. I define the aggregate level
4As emphasized in Chang et al. (2019), in this setting, adjustments along the intensive margin
generate larger increases in efficiency units than those along the extensive margin. Due to this, I
report, among other relevant moments, the mean aggregate efficiency units of labor.
5Here, I also follow the interpretation used in Fehr and F. Kindermann (2018).
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of human capital by HCt. The idiosyncratic component zj follows an AR(1) process
defined by :
zj+1 = ρzj + εj, εj ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (1.10)
which is discretized in a Markov chain with transition matrix πz,z′ = Pr(zj+1 = z
′|zj =
z) and stationary distribution Π(z).
From age JR and onwards labour supply is forcefully zero and agents live off
potential transfers, retirement benefits and accumulated wealth. I also assume that
there is no altruistic bequest motive and there is the certainty of death at J + 1.
Hence, agents alive at age J consume all resources, implying aJ+1 = 0.
1.3.5 Government
The government runs a welfare system designed to mimic the one of the U.S. economy,
has pure public spending Gt, payments of its debt stock Bt, and collect taxes from
households to finance it. I assume that both spending and public debt are defined by
exogenous and constant shares of Yt given by bG and bB, respectively.
The revenue to finance welfare and spendings is levied by an exogenous tax rate
on capital income, τr, a non-linear, exogenous, and progressive tax schedule on labor
income, Tl(y), and an endogenous tax rate on consumption τc,t that adjusts to balance
the government budget. Finally, an endogenous payroll tax rate τSS,t separately
balances the budget of the Social Security system.
The labor income tax function is given by Tl(y) = yj − τ0y(1−τ1), where τ0 is
the scale parameter that defines the level of the average tax rate and τ1 is the pa-
rameter that governs the degree of progressivity implied by the curvature of the
function. This formulation was initially used in Benabou (2002) and has recently
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become the benchmark in the literature measuring the impact of top-income taxation
in government revenue in general equilibrium economies with heterogeneous agents
(Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura, 2016; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante,
2017; Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk, 2019). I denote by TLt the aggregate level
of labor income tax collected.
The Income Security system (IS) is composed of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), other means-tested cash transfers such as the Suplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP) or the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI), available only when agents retire. I
model the brackets and testing details of the EITC exactly as defined by the Internal
Revenue Services (IRS) by following the formulations in Ortigueira and Siassi (2019),
and use a simplified way modelling of the SNAP and TANF programs for tractability
purposes in a similar fashion to Wellschmied (2020). The SSI is modeled as defined
by the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA).
First, it is helpful to lay out key definitions used in the characterization of the
transfer programs. Total labor income y(l, hj, zj) will henceforth stand for gross
income and d = ra for investment income. I also need to define gross adjusted income
as ya ≡ y(l, hj, zj) + d. The EITC is a refundable credit in which the eligibility is
determined by two criteria: first, investment income cannot exceed a level d̄TC and
second, gross adjusted income cannot be higher than an upper bound ȳkTC which
depends on the number of children nk,j present in the household. As it is defined as a
percentage of positive labor income y, it is, in essence, a work subsidy. The payment
structure is composed by three parts: a phase-in region, a so-called plateau region,
and a subsequent phase-out region.
The individual level of transfers for the EITC is defined as TTC and the overall
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structure is summarized as follows:
TTC [y, d, j] =

κk1y, if 0 ≤ y < yk
κk1y
k, if yk ≤ y < ȳk
max{κk1yk − κk2(y − ȳk), 0}, y > ȳk
0, if d > d̄TC or ya > ȳ
k
TC or j ≥ JR
(1.11)
where κk1 and κ
k
2 are the phase-in and phase-out rates, respectively, and y
k and ȳk
are the income thresholds for the plateau. Note that all brackets are indexed by k,
which stands for the dependance on the number of children nk,j. The investment
eligibility requirement, on the other hand, is invariant to such number. I define the
total aggregate level of transfers paid via the EITC by TTCt, standing for total tax
credit.
I model the other means-tested cash transfer programs in a similar fashion, with
the difference that now thresholds are on households’ asset holdings and adjusted
income, as it is defined in the tax code for both the SNAP and the TANF. The SSI,
given the absence of labor income during retirement, is only tested for households’
asset level. I denote thie maximum level of assets for both the TANF and the SNAP as
d̄CT , and the maximum level of adjusted income for the SNAP as ȳCT . I abstract from
all other qualitative requirements for eligibility regarding family size or co-habitation
of parents for households with children as well as the tapering in their phase-out
brackets.
The payment schedule for the individual level of transfers TCT for such programs
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is thus defined below:
TCT [ya, a, j] =

tSNAP , if a ≤ d̄CT and ya ≤ ȳCT and j < JR
tSSI , if a ≤ d̄SSI and j ≥ JR
0, otherwise
(1.12)
where tSNAP and tSSI are the transfer values. I denote the total aggregate level of
cash transfers by TCTt, standing for total cash transfers. The total expenditure of
the government on means-tested cash transfers is then defined as the sum TRt =
TTCt + TCTt.
The SS system is operated in a pay-as-you-go schedule. It is balanced by a payroll
tax rate τSS,t and pays retirement benefits independent of individuals’ history defined
by b(xt) = bSSxt, where bSS is the replacement rate and xt is the average level of
labor earnings of period t− 1, normalized by the measure of working households.
At last, I also assume that the government is responsible for collecting all acci-
dental bequests qj, denoted by Qt when at the aggregate level. Hence, at any time t
the budget of the tax system is balanced if, and only if,
Gt + (1 + rt)Bt + TRt = τc,tCt + TLt + τrrtAt +Qt + (1 + gn)Bt+1. (1.13)
Here we have that, in the aggregate, the transition path is characterized by several
time-dependent endogenous objects, including the government’s debt. This formula-
tion follows the one in Fabian Kindermann and Krueger (2018) and, by assumption,
the govenment does not run fiscal deficits to ensure satisfaction of its budget con-
straint.
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1.3.6 Recursive Household Problem
Let v(s) denote the value function of a j year old agent. As defined previously,
s = (a, h, z, k, θ, j) ∈ S is the individual state space. Also, let vR(s) for j = JR, . . . , J
denote the value function of an individual aged j who is retired and receives So-
cial Security benefits. I normalize the value function of the terminal age J to zero,
vR(s−j, J+1) = 0, where henceforth s−j stands for the individual state-space without
the age dimension.
The problem of an agent with age j = 1, . . . , JR−1 that lies inside the fraction pk
of the population that bears children in their life-cycle is represented in the recursive
form in the Bellman equation (1.14) below. For the agents inside the fraction (1−pk),
the definition is identical with k = 0, ∀j.
v(a, h, z; k = 1, θ, j) = max
c,a′,l
u(c, l) + βψj+1Ez [v(a′, h′, z′; k = 1, θ, j + 1)]
s.t.
(1.14)
(1 + τc)c+ a
′ + η1[l>l̄, (j−ji)≤2] = a(1 + r(1− τr)) + (1− τSS)y(l, h, z)
− Tl[y(l, h, z)] + TTC [y(l, h, z), d, j] + TCT [ya, a, j]






ji ≤ j + 1 ≤ ji + 17
]
c > 0, a′ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1
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For individuals at ages j = JR, . . . , J the problem is:
vR(a, j) = max
c,a′
u(c, 0) + βψj+1v
R(a′, j + 1)
s.t.
(1.15)
(1 + τc)c+ a
′ = a(1 + r(1− τr)) + b(x) + TCT [0, a, j]
c > 0, a′ ≥ 0
The solution of the dynamic programs (1.14) and (1.15) provides us the decision
rules for the asset holdings a : S → R+, consumption c : S → R++, and labour supply
l : S → [0, 1].
1.3.7 Equilibrium
Agents are heterogeneous at each point in time in the state s ∈ S. The agents’
distribution among the states s is described by a measure of probability Φt defined
on subsets of the state space S. Let (S,B(S),Φt) be a space of probability, where
B(S) is the Borel σ-algebra on S. For each ω ⊂ B(S), Φt(ω) denotes the fraction of
agents that are in probability state ω. There is a transition function Mt(s, ω) which
governs the movement over the state space from time t to time t+1 and that depends
on the invariant probability distribution of the idiosyncratic shock Π(z) and on the
decision rules obtained from the household’s problem.
The definition below stands for the recursive competitive equilibrium. The defi-
nition for the stationary equilibrium can be found in Section 1.A.4 of the Appendix.
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Definition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A recursive competitive equi-
librium with population growth for this economy is an allocation of value functions
{vt(s), vRt (s)}∞t=0, policy functions {ct(s), a′t(s), lt(s)}∞t=0, prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, produc-
tions plans for the firm {Kt, Lt}∞t=0, consumption taxes {τc,t}∞t=0, social security taxes
and benefits {τSS,t, b(xt)}∞t=0, aggregate transfers {TRt}∞t=0, government expenditures
and debt {Gt, Bt}∞t=0, accidental bequests {Qt}∞t=0, and an age-dependent measure of
agents {Φt}∞t=0, such that, ∀t:
1. Given factor prices, taxes and transfers, and initial conditions, the value func-
tions {vt(s), vRt (s)} and policy functions {a′t(s), ct(s), lt(s)} solve the households’
optimization problems (1.14) and (1.15);
2. The individual and aggregate behaviours are consistent:
Gt = gyYt, Bt = gbYt
(1 + gn)Kt+1 =
∫
S








exp(θ + zj)ht(s)`(lt(s))dΦt (s−j, {1, . . . , JR − 1})
3. {rt, wt} are such that they satisfy the firm’s first-order conditions (2.5) and
(2.6);
4. The final good market clears:




t + (1− δk)Kt
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[TTC,t(s) + TCT,t(s)] dΦt(s) + (1 + rt)Bt = Qt +∫
S
[




dΦt(s) + (1 + gn)Bt+1




b(xt)dΦt (s−j, {JR, . . . , J})




(1− ψj+1)a′t (s) dΦt (s)




Mt(s, ω)dΦt(s), ∀ω ⊂ B(S),
where Mt : (S,B(S))→ (S,B(S)), can be written as folllows: ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , J},
Mt(s, ω) =
πz,z
′ · ψj+1 , if a′t(s) ∈ A, h′t(s) ∈ H, k ∈ K, θ ∈ Θ, j + 1 ∈ {2, . . . , J}
0 , otherwise.
and for j ∈ {1},
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pk · pθ , if 0 ∈ A, h0 ∈ H, z̄ ∈ Z
0 , otherwise,
where pk and pθ are, respectively, the probabilities of being a household with chil-
dren and of drawing θ out of its discretized distribution. The initial conditions
are a0 = 0, h0 = 1, and z̄, the average level of productivity.
1.4 Calibration
1.4.1 Demographics
In the model agents are born at j = 1 which stands for age 20 in real life, start their
retirement at age JR = 45, standing for 65 in real life, and die with probability one
at age J = 80, equivalent to 100 years old. The age-dependent survival probabilities
{ψj}Jj=1 are the ones estimated by Fehr and F. Kindermann (2018) for the U.S.
population in 2010. The population growth is set to be gn = 1.1%, the average
long run value for the US. I set the fraction of households that will have children
during their lifespan to pk = 30%. They will have three children born at ages j
i =
{27, 30, 33}, being then I = {1, 2, 3} in equation (1.1) that defines the number of
children at age j, nk,j (Fehr and F. Kindermann, 2018). The number of children is
set to a maximum of 3 due to the design of the EITC as defined by the IRS. More
details are discussed in Appendix 1.A.3.
25
1.4.2 Preferences
The period utility is






where ϕ controls intensity of labor vs. consumption, γ governs the Frisch elastic-
ity. Preferences are in King-Plosser-Rebelo form and are consistent with a balanced
growth path.
I set γ = 1 as in Lopez-Daneri (2016). I jointly and endogenously calibrate ϕ and
l̄, so that the aggregate average hours dedicated to work are a third of the household’s
unit endowment of time H = 33% and the Labor Force Participation rate (LFP) is
73.9%. The first number is standard in the literature and the second one is calculated
using the data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) taken from Current Population
Survey (CPS) for males older than 20. In order to smooth the effect of recent changes
in the secular trend of this statistic, I calculate separately the LFP for this range for
2008 (75.6%) and 2018 (72.2%) and reach the targeted moment by taking a simple
average of them6. Finally, I endogenously calibrate the time discount factor β to
match a capital-output ratio of K/Y = 2.9, as in Fabian Kindermann and Krueger
(2018).
1.4.3 Technology
I set the capital share of the economy to be α = 35% as in Lopez-Daneri (2016),
which is the average in the U.S. between 1960-2007. I calibrate the depreciation rate
of capital δk so that the benchmark steady-state real interest rate is r = 4%.
6The table can be found in this link.
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1.4.4 Labor Income
As mentioned above, I calibrate the parameter l̄ governing the wedge between hours
and earnings jointly with ϕ to match average hours and the LFP rates. The variance
for the permanent ability shock is calibrated to be σ2θ = 0.349 in order to target
the Gini index of the earnings distribution. The bend points {ν1, ν2} for the returns
to experience in the human capital law of motion are taken from the coefficients
estimated in the Mincerian regression given by equation (1.20) shown in the Appendix.
As the third coefficient of the cubic polynomial is of a small order of magnitude and
has a less straightforward economic interpretation, I consider only the first two. The
depreciation of human capital is taken from the value estimated in Guvenen, Kuruscu,
and Ozkan (2014) and thus set to δh = 1.5%.
If households have kids with age ji ∈ {0, 1, 2} in the household, they pay childcare
cost η = 0.048 whenever they have positive labor supply. This value is calibrated to
target childcare costs standing for 11% of the average household income. The number
is taken from the 2018 report “The US and the High Cost of Child Care” released
by Child Care Aware of America7 and stands for the average level of the share of
earnings paid by married couples based on different methodology of calculations that
take into account the main stages of childhood. Finally, the persistence ρ and the
error variance σ2ε are the ones obtained by the estimation of the income process from
the SIPP 2008. I use the point estimates obtained with the identity matrix as the
GMM weighting matrix. The methodology is described in the Appendix and depicted
in Table 1.18.
7The report can be found in this link.
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1.4.5 Government
I follow Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2019) and choose the fractions bG = 7.25%
and bB = 61.85% such that the value of pure public consumption, G, is equal to two
times the military spending and that the outstanding government debt, B, in the
model is equal to US’s debt-to-GDP ratio.
On the taxation side, I calibrate the capital income tax rate as τr = 7.4% as
in Lopez-Daneri (2016). I set the parameters governing the progressive income tax
function as in Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2019), where they use OECD tax
data to find the values for married couples in the US. That yields scale parameter
τ0 = 0.9420 and curvature τ1 = 0.1577. Finally, the payroll contribution rate of the
Social Security system, τSS, is calibrated endogenously to target areplacement rate
bSS = 36%. This is the median rate calculated by the CBO based on either the highest
35 years of earnings or the last 5 years of substantial earnings. It is the number
calculated for both sexes and including all quintiles of the earnings distribution8.
As mentioned previously, the tax on consumption τc is the endogenous equilibrium
outcome that balances the government budget.
I follow an approach based on Ortigueira and Siassi (2019) and Birinci (2019)
to guide the way in which I discipline the choice of relative magnitudes between the
parameters, brackets, and transfers sizes based on the transfers code that characterize
the IS programs and model units. The whole IS system embedded in the model
amounts to 29 parameters. As there are values and references to documentation, I
explain it all in detail in Appendix 1.A.3.
8More details can be found in the report via this link.
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1.4.6 Summary of Calibration
I summarize the information associated with the calibrated parameters in the se-
quence of tables below. In Table 2.2, one can find the exogenously calibrated param-
eters and their sources. Table 2.3 shows the endogenously calibrated parameters, the
targeted moments associated with each of them, and the source of such moments for
their data counterparts. Finally, in another set of tables in the Appendix, I display
all the parameters and values used in the model economy’s Income Security system.
Table 1.19 and 1.20 collects the EITC parameters. In Tables 1.21 and 1.22 one can
find the parameters for the remaining IS programs.
Table 1.1: Exogenously calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value Target / Source
Demographics
Model’s terminal and retirement ages JJ , JR 80, 45 Ages 100 and 65
Population growth np 1.1% Historical data
Survival probabilities {ψj}Jj=1 - Fehr and F. Kindermann (2018)
Ages children are born {ni}3i=1 27, 30, 33 Exogenous
Fraction of pop. with children pk 30% Bureau of Labor Statistics
Preferences
Frisch elasticity γ 1.00 Lopez-Daneri (2016)
Technology
Capital share α 0.35 Historical data
Labor Income
Persistence and variance of AR(1) {ρ, σ2ε} 0.9342, 0.0176 SIPP 2008
Human capital returns {ν1, ν2} 0.0533, -0.0013 SIPP 2008
Depreciation rate of human capital δh 1.5% Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014)
Government
Public consumption goods, national debt {bG, bB} 7.25%, 61.85% Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2019)
Investment income tax rate τr 7.4% Lopez-Daneri (2016)
Scale and curvature of income taxes {τ0, τ1} 0.9420, 0.1577 Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2019)
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Table 1.2: Endogenously calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value Target Source
Preferences
Discount factor β 0.982 K/Y = 2.9 Fabian Kindermann and Krueger (2018)
Disutility of labor ϕ 16.994 H = 33% Standard
Commuting costs l̄ 0.192 LFP = 73.9% Bureau of Labor Statistics
Labor Income
Childcare cost η 0.048 11% of ȳ Child Care Aware of America
Variance of permanent shocks σ2θ 0.349 Earn. Gini = 0.44 SIPP 2008
Technology
K depreciation rate δk 7.8% r
∗ = 4% Standard
Government
SS Payroll tax τSS 10.61% bSS = 36% Congressional Budget Office
1.5 The Benchmark Economy
1.5.1 Aggregates
I begin the assessment of the benchmark economy by reporting the equilibrium quan-
tities of the main aggregate variables of the model and comparing them to their coun-
terpart targeted and non-targeted levels in the data. Table 1.3 below summarizes the
moments of the benchmark model with the baseline welfare system composed of the
means-tested transfers. The model matches closely several of the aggregate levels of
interest. The capital-to-ouput ratio, K/Y , the aggregate level of hours worked, H,
the equilibrium interest rate, r, and the labor force participation (LFP) are all at their
targeted levels. The investment-to-GDP ratio, I/Y , and the consumption-to-GDP
ratio, C/Y , were not targeted but are both at levels coherent with the historical US
data.
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The size of the IS system, captured by the share of the total amount of transfers by
the GDP, TR/Y , is approximately double the size of the one calculated by the CBO.
Even though the parameters for this system are calibrated to reflect the relative
share of their values in our model economy, the risky nature of the environment
under incomplete markets endogenously selects households for regions where they
can obtain insurance. As there is no other source of direct insurance during the
working age besides savings, it is natural that the endogenous outcome would lean
towards a reliance on the IS system for this purpose. This is thus reflected in a larger
share of the transfer system that was initially exogenously calibrated in the model.
As I target the replacement rate of the SS system, bSS, the payroll tax used to
close the system’s budget endogenously achieves the rate of 10.61%, which is thus
non-targeted and close to the 12.4% rate set by the IRS. A similar pattern applies to
the endogenous tax on consumption, τc, with the difference that the US does not have
such tax at the federal level. Nonetheless, the value obtained of 6.7% is not far from
the level estimated in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), and this rate provides an estimate
of the tax burden of the benchmark income security system to provide aggregate level
of transfers TR, which is key in the counterfactual comparisons.
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Table 1.3: Aggregate variables at the benchmark economy.
Variable Benchmark Target / Data Source
Targeted
K/Y 290.0% 290% Standard
H 32.1% 33% Standard
LFP 74.1.3% 73.9% BLS
r 0.042 0.040 Standard
Untargeted
C/Y 64.4% 68% FRED
I/Y 25.5% 17% FRED
TR/Y 2.6% 1.3% CBO
τc 6.7% 5% Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
τSS 10.6% 12.4% IRS
Note: The data counterparts shown in the table are taken from several sources. I use the
last available period of FRED St. Louis data for share of personal consumption expenditures
over GDP, and gross private domestic investment over GDP. It can be found, respectively, in
the following links: here, and here. The CBO data stands for the breakdown of mandatory
spending in 2018 and can be found here. The SS withtholding rate is defined by the IRS and
can be found here.
1.5.2 Earnings and Wealth Distributions
The evaluation of the model fit is also depends on the comparison of the inequality
on labor earnings and wealth in the benchmark economy with the one observed in the
data. Table 1.4 below shows such distributional outcomes of the model in comparison
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with the SIPP 2008 estimates, all of those untargeted moments, except, as mentioned
previously, for the Gini coefficient of the labor earnings distribution.
The model is able to closely approximate the earnings distribution, with some
relatively small overstatement in the fourth quintiles and understatement of the third
quintile. Given that we have estimated the wage process directly from our sample
of the SIPP data and exogenously fed into the model this source of earnings risk,
such positive result is expected. However, the close fit in terms of magnitude in all
quintiles is reassuring that the labor income side of the baseline economy is able to
exhibit similar behavior to the data.
A second and more rigorous assesment of the fit can be done by observing the
wealth distribution outcomes. As the savings decisions is one of the critical endoge-
nous choices of the agents in the model, their behavior in terms of these choices gives
us a more accurate understanding on whether the environment of the benchmark
economy captures correctly the mechanism behind such decision in the data. The
model is not able to quantify precisely the share of wealth across the quintiles, how-
ever, the Gini coefficient is not very far from the one calculated in our sample of the
SIPP data.
At very bottom of the wealth distribution, as the model does not allow borrowing,
the distribution stops at zero assets. It is not able then to capture the negative value
standing for debt, as observed in the data for the first quintile. However, the model is
overall able to capture a low level of savings for the first three quintiles, approximating
well the distribution computed in the data from other surveys such as the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Kuhn
and Rios-Rull, 2015; Krueger, Mitman, and Perri, 2016a). As the SIPP data for
assets is taken from a point in time provided in a topical module, it is reassuring that
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the model is at least consistent with other data sources9. This outcome is mainly
possible due to a combination of two model ingredients: the steep profile in earnings
generated by the human capital accumulation component and the different levels of
assets and investment income testing that the IS system imposes to agents in the
economy.
The intuition behind this outcome comes from the fact that households are born
with zero assets and then climb up the savings ladder as they receive the idiosyncratic
shocks. The shocks are persistent and households that receive low level shocks end
up always preferring to choose a smaller level of assets in order to frontload consump-
tion when incentive to work are small. This consumption-savings trade-off is further
enhanced by the presence of means-tested transfers. This point is developed again
later, when I highlight the distortions induced by the means-testing vis-a-vis the the
UBI 10.
9I add summary statistics alongside with more details and explanations on the SIPP 2008 panel
used in the Appendix 1.A.1
10Such low wealth accumulation due to assets means-testing has a similar mechanism to the one
pointed in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and re-emphasized in Wellschmied (2020).
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Table 1.4: Earnings and wealth distribution.
Earnings Wealth
Data Model Data Model
Quantile
Bottom 20% 3.7% 4.0% -0.7% 0.0%
20% - 40% 9.1% 8.8% 1.8% 0.6%
40% - 60% 15.0% 13.6% 7.7% 1.4%
60% - 80% 23.4% 25.0% 20.5% 14.5%
80% - 100% 48.7% 48.5% 70.7% 83.4%
Gini 0.44 0.44 0.70 0.77
Note: The data counterparts shown in the table are all
taken from my own calculations from the SIPP 2008 panel.
A more detailed description can be found in the Section
1.A.1 of the Appendix.
1.5.3 The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
A final step taken towards evaluating the model fit consists of checking whether
the predicted behavior of the model economy aggregates are in accordance with the
empirical evidence of the effects of unconditional transfers on the labor side of the
economy. In order to do so, I will compare the outcomes of the model to some of
the estimates of Jones and Marinescu (2018) for the impact of the Alaska Permanent
Fund Dividend. As mentioned before, the Alaska’s experience is by now the closest
we can get in terms of empirical evidence to an understanding of the macroeconomic
and general equilibrium impact of unconditional transfers in the US.
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The idea behind this validation is to operate the following thought experiment:
we start with the economy at the initial steady-state with the means-tested transfer
system and then move to a counterfactual economy where all households receive the
dividend. The structure of benefits is maintained intact, and thus the dividend is just
an addition on top of the currently existing benefits. This extra expenditure in the
government’s budget constraint is funded by windfall revenues and thus there is no
need for the adjustment of taxes to keep the government budget constraint balanced.
The size of the transfer distributed to each of the households is the equivalent of US
$1,115 in model units, which is the average dividend level from 1982 to 201811. This
yields a transfer of 1.9% of the GDP per capita in the model economy.
In the first row of Table 1.5 below, I show the relevant point estimates taken from
Jones and Marinescu (2018). The first column shows the difference in the average
employment rate between Alaska and their controlled sample. This is the evidence
that highlights the adjustment of the extensive margin of labor and shows virtually
zero effects with a point estimate of -0.001. In the second column, I move to one
of their measures of adjustment at the intensive margin, which is the part-time rate
(part-time employment as a share of the population). They estimate an aggregate
increase of 1.8 percentage points between treatment and control averages.
In the second and third rows of Table 1.5, I show the differences in model averages
between the benchmark and counterfactual economies. Moreover, in order to highlight
the role of general equilibrium effects and how the adjustment of aggregate demand
and supply of labor in the economy brings the model behavior closer to the data, I
report both partal and general equilibrium results.
It is also worth to notice that the results for the part-time rate require a mapping
11The table with the historical data of the dividend is provided by the Alaska Department of
Revenue - Permanent Fund Dividend Division and can be found in this link.
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of this definition in terms of the model economy. As in Jones and Marinescu (2018)
the main data source is the Current Population Survey (CPS), part-time employment
is defined as less than 35 hours of work per week. As labor supply in the model is
defined in terms of percentage of the unit endowment of time of households, part-time
is then approximately the use of 29% or less of their endowment when compared to a
full-time work week. Given that the model has the non-convex mapping between hours
and earnings defined in equation (1.7), it exhibits a continuous intensive margin that
allows for this notion to be well-defined in terms of the model labor supply allocations.
The results in Table 1.5 show that the model is able to replicate the signs and
approximate the order of magnitude of the changes in the average employment rate
and the average part-time rate. Moreover, the general equilibirum component is
crucial for the model not to overstate such changes. In fact, for the employment
rate, the availability of windfall transfers for the households dampens their extensive
margin, yielding a drop at the employment rate which is attenuated once the general
equilibrium effect is added. The decrease in the labor supply is followed by the
adjustment in the competitive wage, which increases, thus pushing labor supply to
increase back, diminishing the net effect on the employment rate. A similar intuition
applies to the movement in the part-time rate. As more transfers are available,
households can now operate in their intensive margin, increasing leisure and thus the
part-time rate. Given that the price of labor adjusts to this movement, incentives to
work more grow, and the part-time rate falls accordingly.
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Table 1.5: Estimated differences between treatment and control for Alaska.
Differences of Averages
Employment Rate Part-time Rate
Data -0.001 0.018
Model - Partial Equilibrium -0.022 0.007
Model - General Equilibrium -0.019 0.002
Note: The row for data show the estimates obtained in Jones and Marinescu (2018). The rows
for the model shows diferences between model aggregates in the benchmark and counterfactual
economies.
1.6 Quantitative Exercises
In this section I outline the results of the quantitative exercises conducted highlighting
the impacts on aggregates, life-cycle profiles, and inequality. In section 1.6.1, I discuss
the thought experiment behind the expenditure-neutral UBI counterfactual, its results
and the mechanism behind the economies with and without means-testing. In section
1.6.2, I then move to a UBI reform with a level of US$12,000 annualy. In sections
1.6.3 and 1.6.4, I discuss, respectively, the impact of both reforms on inequality and
the government budget constraint.
1.6.1 Expenditure-neutral UBI
The idea behind the counterfactual towards a UBI reform of the Income Security
system is simple: substitute all transfers TTC [y, d, j] and TCT [ya, a, j] defined in (1.11)
and (1.12) with an unconditional payment TRUBI . I hold constant the commitment
on spending and debt level, G = bGY , B = bBY , and distribute to the households the
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same aggregate level of total transfers TR computed for the benchmark equilibrium
in a per household base. The budget constraint of the household then becomes:
if j < Jr : (1 + τc)c+ a
′ + η1[l>l̄] = a(1 + r(1− τr))
+ (1− τSS)y(l, h, z)− Tl[y(l, h, z)] + TRUBI (1.17)
if j ≥ Jr : (1 + τc)c+ a′ = a(1 + r(1− τr)) + b(x) + TRUBI (1.18)
The government budget balance remains being financed with consumption taxes -
i.e., with τc endogenously changing - and equation (1.13) holds in the same way with
the substitution of TR by TRUBI . These transfers have the same exact numerical
value in this expenditure-neutral exercise.
Aggregates
In Table 1.6 below, I summarize the aggregate changes generated by the counterfac-
tual exercise in comparison with the benchmark scenario. With respect to the labor
supply response, the impact on aggregate hours is moderate, with the overall level
climbing to about 1 percentage point higher than the one in the benchmark. This
happens because, in the counterfactual economy, households no longer need to ad-
just their intensive margin downwards to fall inside the means-testing brackets. The
UBI mostly operates via the income effect, shown by the movement at the extensive
margin which decreases the labor force participation by one percentage point.
One can also observe the impact of the reform on the budget captured by τc,
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which is now slightly smaller than the benchmark level due to the decrease in TR/Y .
I explore this point further and in convolution with the distributional outcomes in the
breakdown of the government constraint in 1.6.4. The capital-output ratio is larger in
the UBI economy, mainly driven by the increase in savings and yielding higher levels
of capital, which then pushes the increase in the output level.
The aggregate stock of human capital in relation to output, HC/Y , decreases by
more than ten percentage points due to the decrease in the number of participants in
the labor force, without the participation of high productivity households. Following
the small levels of movement in L, the impact on labor earnings inequality is negligible
while there is a significant decrease on wealth inequality, which mostly stems from an
increase of the wealth accrued by all the bottom 4 quintiles with a reduction of the
wealth accrued by the very top quintile. This movement happens due to the release
of the investment and asset-testing constraints that provided a extra incentive for
smaller savings in the benchmark scenario. Together with that, there is a decrease in
the accumulation of capital by agents that receive high and persistent labor income
shocks. The combination of such movements are then driving the force behind the
capital stock increase.
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Earnings Gini 0.44 0.44
Wealth Gini 0.77 0.70
Note: The column with name “Means-Tested”
shows the results of the benchmark model and the




In order to understand the mechanism behind the movements shown in the aggregate
effects, I explore below the sources of distortions arising from the different types of
means-testings in the model. I do so for selected parts of the state-space that are
chosen to highlight where such testings are more salient.
In Figure 1.1 below, I show the assets’ policy function for a 80 years old retired
household. At this age, in the original means-tested economy, such household would
only be subject to an assets means-testing stemmimg from the SSI. Besides the SS
benefits and the households savings, the only other source of income available are
the benefits of this program. In the left-hand side graph, one can see how the policy
function of the agent becomes flat once it hits the assets-testing constraints.
The intuition behind that is that at certain level of assets, the household prefers
to choose to stay exactly at the constraint in order to seize the benefit payed by the
program. It has strong incentives to do so, as by choosing to save a smaller amount
than it would otherwise for that level of asset, it can increase its current period
consumption not only by dissaving, but also by having access to a larger income.
On the right-hand graph, this trade-off is made clearer, as in the UBI economy,
such distortion does not exist and hence the policy function for assets does not stay
constant for such a wide range of the assets’ state-space and allows the household
to achieve higher values, an expected result of releasing a constraint in the dynamic
programming problem. All lines lie below the 45 degree line, showing that this is a
dissaving region, consistent with the retirement period of the household.
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Figure 1.1: Distortions stemming from assets means-testing in the comparison be-
tween the benchmark economy as the first counterfactual UBI scenario.
Figure 1.2 portrays the labor supply distortions at low asset holdings and low and
high productivity households in the means-tested economy. It zooms in the state-
space of a household with 40 years old, and distinguishes on whether it has children
or not. On the left-hand side, we can see from top to bottom the differences in labor
supply allocations between productivity levels in both economies. Households with
low productivity have a double-incentive to work less as not only their marginal cost
to supply labor is higher but the means-testing transfers might incentivize them to
fall inside the income brackets. As the assets-testing of the EITC is on investment
income, hence non-binding for households at the bottom of the wealth distribution,
the highest incentive to adjust is on the labor supply margin. Comparing the top
and bottom graphs, it is clear that for the smallest level of productivity, there is no
significant change in the labor supply of households.
A more perceptible behavior happens with households with high productivity.
Even though adjustments are small, one can observe that for high productivity agents,
labor supply under the UBI economy is higher for any asset level. This happens
because their extensive margin adjustment is unaffected by the design of the transfer
system. However, with the extra transfer received unconditionally under the UBI
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regime, households are not anymore subject to disencentive to work generated by the
means-tested transfers.
On the graphs on the right-hand side, we see the difference in behavioral responses
for agents with children. For low productivity agents, the reaction to the change in
regime of transfer is now different than the one mentioned previously: in the UBI
economy, low productivity households are free to work less not being incentivized by
the EITC to a highly child-dependent incentive to supply labor. However, for the
high productivity households with children, the response now operates in the reverse
direction. As the initial means-tested system for them was roughly being accessed
via the EITC, the generosity of the money received is then heavily dependent on the
presence of children in the household. Hence, households before had the incentive
to work at their initial level and obtain sizeable amounts of transfers. In the UBI
economy, as it is independent on the number of children for the money received by
the household, labor supply has to be higher in higher level of assets.
Figure 1.2: Distortions stemming from earnings and assets means-testing in the com-
parison between the benchmark economy as the first counterfactual UBI scenario.
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1.6.2 Andrew Yang’s UBI
The second counterfactual conducted is a non-neutral increase on the the total amount
of transfers TR of the economy to the level equivalent to TR/Y = 20% in the initial
steady-state. This exercise is inspired by the policy proposal advocated by Andrew
Yang, a candidate to the primaries of the Democratic Party for the presidential elec-
tion of the United States in 202012. The thought experiment is then to give every
agent in the economy a UBI that would amount to US$12,000 per year, or US$1,000
monthly. We proceed in an otherwise identical fashion as the previous counterfactual
exercise.
Table 1.7 below shows the results for the aggregate quantities. As expected,
the budget cost to raise the level of transfers to the desired level is high and hence
the taxation on consumption has to climb up to 38.4% to balance the government’s
budget. Such high taxation combined with the high level of transfers end up driving
agents to react sharply in terms of their labor supply. The intensive margin captured
by the aggregate hours decreases substantially, reducing about 15 percentage points.
The same sharp drop is seen in the LFP, which now shows that less than a half of
the households work in this economy. These large movements in the labor side of the
economy are in a great extent driven by the non-convex structure present in the labor
supply. With the commuting costs, the aggregate response in labor is amplified due
to the larger macro Frisch elasticity that this formulation yields. As the environment
is in general equilirbium, there is an accompanying adjustment of the wage rate,
which increases by more than 1%. As we have seen in the exercise for the Alaska
experiments, this force attenuates the effects on the labor side of the economy, but in
the case of this large level of transfers, the rise in the return to labor is not enough
to prevent the large drop observed.
12Andrew Yang’s “Freedom Dividend” policy proposal can be found on this link.
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The overall result is that the economy contracts significantly and becomes much
more unequal in terms of pre-tax labor earnings. However, both the capital-to-ouput
and the consumption-to-output ratios increase due to the fact that the output de-
creases relatively more than K and C. Lastly, the total stock of human capital
in the economy HC, exhibits a substantial decrease when compared to the former
steady-states, but a higher value in terms of GDP whe compared with the former
counterfactual . This result stems from a selection effect operating behind the exten-
sive margin: low productivity agents sort themselves into zero labor supply due to
the generous consumption floor created by the UBI while high productivity agents
remain attached to the labor force throughout their life-cycle with virtually no de-
preciation of their individual human capital. The rearrangement towards inequality
shown by the Gini is then a byproduct of such process and happens directly through
the accrual of more earnings at the top that arise through the sharp drop in labor of
low productivity households. This result is further seen in Table 1.8.
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Table 1.7: Comparison of aggregates for the second counterfactual.
Variable Means-Tested UBI UBI AY
Y 100 104.3 74.1
K 100 106.3 75.8
L 100 103.2 73.3
C 100 104.0 77.5
HC 100 101.0 74.5
H 32.1% 33.0% 18.2%
LFP 74.1% 73.2% 42.3%
K/Y 290.0% 296.6% 296.3%
C/Y 64.4% 64.1% 67.2%
L/Y 56.3% 55.8% 55.7%
HC/Y 401.4% 388.7% 403.1%
TR/Y 2.5% 2.4% 26.9%
w 1.153 1.165 1.166
r 0.042 0.040 0.040
τc 6.7% 5.7% 38.4%
Earnings Gini 0.44 0.44 0.62
Wealth Gini 0.77 0.70 0.76
Note: The column with name “Means-Tested” shows the results
of the benchmark model, the column with label “UBI” shows the
results for the expenditure-neutral counterfactual and the column
with name “UBI AY” shows the results for the exercise inspired
by Andrew Yang’s proposal.
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1.6.3 Impact on Inequality
Table 1.8 shows the distributional outcomes of disposable income and consumption for
the benchmark means-tested model and the two scenarios under the UBI counterfac-
tual. We can observe that the expenditure-neutral UBI is slightly more redistributive
after tax and transfers than the benchmark model. More specifically, the bottom
quintile exhibits a small growth in accrued income under the UBI, which arises as
a reshuffling from income from the second quintile. The small UBI is not uniformly
progressive as the second highest quintile also obtain more post-tax income, mostly
coming through their increase in savings. The second UBI counterfactual exhibits a
different pattern but with slightly more disposable income at the very bottom but a
sharp redistribution towards the highest quintile. This happens due to the suppresi-
sion of earnings caused by the large drop in the labor supply, which keeps only the
highly productive working. It is noteworthy that pre-tax inequality increases in both
counterfactuals as shown in Table 1.7 but post-tax inequality increases in a smaller
level with some redistribution towards the very bottom.
Regarding consumption inequality, the first UBI economy is less equal with a re-
distribution from the bottom two quintiles to the the two immediate upward quintiles,
while the second UBI economy exhibits similar inequality to the benchmark and less
than the first counterfactual economy with a cascading effect coming from the top
quintile towards the immediate two bottom quintiles.
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Table 1.8: Comparison of quantiles between benchmark and counterfactuals.
Disposable Income Consumption
MT UBI UBI AY MT UBI UBI AY
Quantile
Bottom 20% 1.2% 1.5% 2.7% 7.7% 7.5% 5.4%
20% - 40% 6.8% 6.6% 3.1% 11.0% 11.8% 9.5%
40% - 60% 12.3% 12.8% 7.6% 16.4% 17.2% 16.7%
60% - 80% 23.4% 24.1% 24.6% 24.7% 24.4% 27.0%
80% - 100% 56.2% 55.0% 61.9% 40.1% 39.0% 41.3%
Gini 0.53 0.52 0.59 0.33 0.31 0.37
Note: The column with name “Means-Tested” shows the results of the benchmark
model, the column with label “UBI” shows the results for the expenditure-neutral
counterfactual and the column with name “UBI AY” shows the results for the
exercise inspired by Andrew Yang’s proposal.
1.6.4 The Government Budget Constraint
In light of all the movements shown previously, it is worth to take a deeper look at
how the transmision of inequality affects the aggregate outcomes. More specifically,
one highly affected equilibrium object is the government budget constraint. In Table
1.9, I show the breakdown of the budget by each of its sources and for each of the
three steady-states analyzed so far.
As can be seen in Table 1.6, the tax rate on consumption, τc, decreases moder-
ately in the first counterfactual. This result is intuitive as all the aggregate inputs
which suffer the incidence of taxation increase in comparison with the benchmark
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economy. In the breakdown below, the net negative revenue stemming from the pro-
gressive taxation on labor is slightly higher, in terms of GDP, than in the benchmark.
The revenue accruing from savings is basically unchanged. This small adjustment
which induces less spending in subsidies for the government accomodates the needs
of resourcing from consumption, allowing for the drop in the rate.
For the second counterfactual, the increase in the consumption tax revenue can
be understood together with the movements shown in Table 1.7. Naturally, as a
substantially higher level of TR/Y needs now to be financed, τc increases sharply.
However, as low productivity households drop of out of the labor force, while the high
productivity ones keep working, total labor input L/Y does not fall as much when
compared to the first counterfactual while aggregate human capital HC/Y per GDP
exhibits a small increase. This is consonance with the higher degree of inequality
shown in the pre-tax earnings Gini. With this new distribution, the endogenous
outcomes allow for total revenue stemming from progressive taxation TL/Y to be
now positive and at a higher level in the breakdown of the budget than in previous
steady-states, which attenuates the increase in consumption revenue needed to fund
the large UBI.
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Table 1.9: Comparison of sources of revenue between benchmark and counterfactuals.
Variable Means-Tested UBI UBI AY
Revenues
τcC/Y 6.7% 5.7% 25.8%
τrrA/Y 1.1% 1.1% 1.1%
TL/Y -1.1% -0.4% 3.9%
Q/Y 5.1% 5.1% 5.2%
Revenue/Y 11.8% 11.5% 36.0%
Expenditures
TR/Y 2.6% 2.4% 26.9%
G/Y 7.2% 7.2% 7.2%
(r − gn)B/Y 2.0% 1.9% 1.9%
Expenditure/Y 11.8% 11.5% 36.0%
Note: The column with name “Means-Tested” shows the results
of the benchmark model, the column with label “UBI” shows the
results for the expenditure-neutral counterfactual and the column
with name “UBI AY” shows the results for the exercise inspired by
Andrew Yang’s proposal.
1.7 Transitional Dynamics
The exercise conducted in the transitional dynamics consists of starting at the initial
steady-state at period t = 0 and, at period t = 1, enact the counterfactual reform.
The policy is permanent and unexpected by the agents. The generations j = 1, . . . , J
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that were alive in period t = 0 will reoptimize to adapt themselves to the new scenario
and prices at the capital and labor markets adjust along the transtion path clearing all
markets in the economy. The adjustment to the new steady-state is close to achieved
in 45 periods, which I use as the maximum due to computational purposes.
1.7.1 Aggregates
Figure 1.3 below depicts the transitional dynamics of the main aggregate variables
and of prices after an the enaction of each of the UBI counterfactual reforms. The
left-hand side shows the expenditure-neutral UBI, while the right-hand side shows
the generous UBI.
Figure 1.3: Transitional dynamics of aggregate variables for the two counterfactual
exercises.
When the first reform is enacted, agents immediately and largely adjust their labor
supply decisions due to the loss of the generous means-tested transfers to a low level
of UBI. This reaction can be observed by the spike in the aggregate labor L which
achieves a level 20% higher than the one of the initial steady-state. Moreover, there is
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also the trade-off between consumption and savings which can be seen in the decrease
of aggregate capital K. The drop in capital at the initial period is nonetheless much
smaller relative to the jump in labor, only starting to increase to the higher levels of
the new steady-state 3 years after the reform. At the final periods, one can observe
that the equilibrium trades the initial movement of the labor supply for the increase
in savings, then achieving the aggregates in the new steady-state, all higher than their
initial levels. The adjustment in prices simply follows the behavior expected from the
decreasing marginal returns of the neoclassical production function.
There is a symmetric initial response of the aggregate variables and prices between
counterfactuals. The second reform, the one of Andrew Yang’s level of UBI, yields
precisely the opposite signs of change in the aggregates. With the new and and un-
expected large transfer, agents drop out of the labor force and work significantly less,
thus reducing L by more than 60%, which then later settles to its lower level. The
extra income combined with the exclusion of assets-testing causes a small increase
in the level of K, which later converges to the smaller level in the new-steady-state
due to the decrease of precautionary savings and hours worked allowed by the UBI’s
consumption floor. An important fact observed in the transition of this counterfac-
tual is that due to non-convex commuting costs associated with the labor supply,
the adjustment in labor is heavily volatile and non-linear, yielding the oscillatory
movements seen until convergence. This movements of labor drive the fluctuations of
output along the transition13.
13At this point, the convergence of this counterfactual is unstable and lacks precision, which I am
currently working in the betterment.
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1.7.2 Inequality at the Transition
In Table 1.10, I show the distributions of disposable income and consumption at the
first period of the transition. The inequality when the reform is enacted highlights the
differences between short and long run that drive the welfare results explained in the
next section. When compared to Table 1.8, one can immediately notice that for the
second counterfactual, the generous UBI, there are significant differences in the results
of all of distributions shown. The most important movement is the redistribution in
the consumption distribution when compared to the benchmark steady-state . There
is an increase in all bottom three quintiles at the expense of a decrease of the top two
quintiles.
For the first exercise, however, there are amplifications in the increase of inequality
in consumption. Differently than in the long run, there is less consumption being
accrued at the bottom and significantly more at the top. The intuition behind this lies
on the fact that for the low strand of the distribution, the amount of transfers received
is smaller than before while for the top earners, their return to work is high enough for
their labor behavior to be positively affected, allowing for more consumption together
with the UBI top-off. The Gini index of the consumption distribution is in this case
2 points higher than the benchmark and 4 points higher than its equivalent in the
steady-state, reflecting the shift of accrual towards the top.
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Table 1.10: Comparison of quantiles between benchmark and counterfactuals at the
transition.
Disposable Income Consumption
MT UBI UBI AY MT UBI UBI AY
Quantile
Bottom 20% 1.2% 2.6% 1.8% 7.7% 6.6% 8.8%
20% - 40% 6.8% 7.5% 4.9% 11.0% 11.0% 11.7%
40% - 60% 12.3% 13.6% 13.3% 16.4% 16.0% 16.9%
60% - 80% 56.2% 23.4% 24.9% 24.7% 23.8% 23.4%
80% - 100% 48.2% 52.8% 54.9% 40.1% 42.5% 39.2%
Gini 0.53 0.49 0.53 0.33 0.35 0.30
Note: The column with name “Means-Tested” shows the results of the benchmark
model, the column with label “UBI” shows the results for the expenditure-neutral
counterfactual and the column with name “UBI AY” shows the results for the
exercise inspired by Andrew Yang’s proposal.
1.8 Welfare
In this section I conduct an evaluation of both reforms through an analysis of the
welfare responses in the short and long run. The context for the welfare analysis is an
inquiry on whether or not to means-test the income security net of the government
based on the computation of a chosen measure of social welfare. Given the initial
conditions, I follow Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2008) and define the utilitarian
Social Welfare Function (SWF) for a newborn agent as follows:
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W ({τ}, ζ, TR) =
∫
S
v∗(a = 0, h = 1, z = z̄, k, θ, j = 1 | {τ}, ζ, TR) dΦ∗ (1.19)
where {τ} are all the taxation parameters, ζ is the collection of means-testing param-
eters, ζ = {ȳkTC , d̄TC , . . .}, TR is the aggregate level of total transfers, and {v∗,Φ∗}
are the equilibrium value functions and distributions.
In Table 1.11 below, I show results for welfare evaluation through the comparison
of the three steady-states studied so far as well as the transition between the bench-
mark and each of the counterfactuals. I report the aggregate steady-state welfare
for households with age j = 1, i.e., the discounted expected value of being born in
each economy through the Consumption Equivalent Variation (CEV). This measure
defines the increment in consumption that we would need to give households in each
state of the world so that they would be indifferent between their level of consumption
in the alternative economies, hence under the veil of ignorance14.
Table 1.11: Comparison of Consumption Equivalent Variation.
UBI UBI AY
CEV Steady-state -0.05% -0.04%
CEV Transition -0.24% 1.22%
Votes 73.13% 80.46%
Note: The column with label “UBI” shows the re-
sults for the expenditure-neutral counterfactual and
the column with name “UBI AY” shows the results
for the exercise inspired by Andrew Yang’s proposal.
14I present the algebra and details on how to obtain the CEV for the model in Appendix 1.A.5.
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The CEV required is of -0.24%, making the expenditure-neutral UBI a policy that
reduces welfare under an utilitarian SWF. The opposite is true for the US$1,000 UBI,
with an increase of 1.22% in welfare. If we take into account the welfare cost at the
transition, - i.e. the cost to the generations that were alive in the period the reform
is enacted and whose choice need to be reoptimized - we observe that the effects of
both reforms is flipped. The intuition behind this movement lies on the distributional
consequences seen before. We have seen in Table 1.10 that inequality in consumption
is higher than in the steady-state, with the disutility of work affecting more the top,
and the dampening of consumption the bottom. Lastly, at the period when the reform
is enacted, if we could subject the proposal to a voting by the generations alive in
that year it would be implemented, it would receive a sound majority in the second
scenario, but also a majority in the first, despite the decrease in welfare. The following
section unpacks the forces behind such votes.
1.8.1 Decomposing the Welfare Effects
In order to understand better who are the winners and losers of both reforms, it is
useful to decompose the welfare changes in different cuts of the state-space. To get a
better sense of the role of the age dimension, I plot below the cross-sectional average
of the value function over the life-cycle, which can be equivalently defined as an age-
dependent SWF in terms of CEV. I do so by showing the average between decades of
households’ lives. Figure 1.4, shows the comparison between the two counterfactuals
both at their steady-states and at the enacted period of the reform.
We can observe in the plot on the left-hand side that the expenditure neutral
system exhibits negative levels of welfare than the benchmark scenario throughout
the life-cycle, with lower levels at the beginning. As households have children in early
ages and the targeted transfers generosity is biased towards families with children,
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it is natural that a transfer with an average level lower than before leaves agents
worse-off in that period of their lives. However, as soon as households start seizing
the increasing path of their earnings profile, the savings they accumulate under the
new UBI regime decreases the dominance of negative welfare. In effect, households
in the benchmark economy at those periods are trapped working less effective hours
and saving less to remain inside the constraints that guarantees the reception of the
benefits. Eventually, in later ages, after the dissaving process is exhausted in each
economy, welfare of both converges to similar levels. During the transition, the losses
are larger and for a larger number of years in households’ lives. The age dimension
also helps us to unveil the source behind the votes shown in Table 1.11, as their
percentage in favor of the reform tracks closely the relative share of ages that have
welfare below the benchmark scenario.
Regarding the second counterfactual, in the long run, the welfare is slightly nega-
tive for the very first ages, being then almost zero for a long part of the working years
almost all the way through retirement. Without the breakdown through the life-cycle,
this effect is masked by the comparison only of newborn households. An important
part of the positive welfare changes only happens closer to retirement, mostly due to
the abence of the assets means-testing of the SSI, a fact common in all profiles in all
comparisons. At the enacted period of the transition, on the other hand, the gains are
uniformly positive across all ages of the cross-section. This once again emphasizes the
benefits of simultaneously working less while seizing a high consumption floor in an
economy that starts with a large amount of capital that slowly decreases. The voting
pattern of more than 80% in favor is thus a natural consequence of this picture.
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Figure 1.4: Value functions over the life-cycle between steady-states and at the period
when the reforms are enacted.
Another important dimension of decomposition is the permanent ability level of
the households. The value θ is the only source of labor income heterogeneity of
households’ initial conditions and directly tracks the overall level of earnings inequal-
ity captured by the Gini index. In Table 1.12, one can observe the breakdown for
the two points in which I discretize this shock. Given the way that wage risk was
estimated, this points can be roughly interpreted as a comparison of college and non-
college levels of initial ability. The results for the steady-states show that there is
an inverse pattern between the two counterfactuals. In the small UBI economy, low
ability households are worse-off due to the expected lack of generosity of the income
security system in the first ages of their lives. High ability households, on the other
hand, will mostly probably be attached to the labor force with high efficiency units
and thus have small but positive welfare stemming from the unconditional transfers.
In the second counterfactual, the direction is opposite, as high ability agents will
mostly likely be the ones suffering the hike in taxation needed to sustain the reform,
they benefit little from the new policy. Low ability households, on the other hand,
anticipate the abundance of leisure and consumption in relative terms and accrue a
substantial part of the gains.
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Table 1.12: Decomposition of Consumption Equivalent Variation.
CEV UBI UBI AY
Steady-State -0.05% -0.04%
Initial Heterogeneity
Low ability -0.0823% 0.0106%
High ability 0.0328% -0.0517%
Note: The column with label “UBI” shows the results
for the expenditure-neutral counterfactual and the column
with name “UBI AY” shows the results for the exercise
inspired by Andrew Yang’s proposal.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I addressed the question on what would be the impact of a nation-
wide reform of the U.S. welfare system to a Universal Basic Income proposal. I
have developed an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic income risk that
incorporates both intensive and extensive margins of labor supply, human capital
accumulation through labor market experience, and child-bearing costs. The model
has a welfare system with an income security net that matches the U.S. design and
accounts for means-testing requirements in income and wealth and its taxation coun-
terparts. The focus of my analysis lied in the changes in aggregates. inequality,
government budget, and welfare.
I calibrated the model to the U.S. and conducted two counterfactual exercises im-
plementing UBI reforms. In the first reform, an expenditure-neutral level of uncondi-
tional transfers generates an income effect that lead households in the UBI economy
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to work more hours and decrease the participation in the labor force. Due to the
absence of restrictions on maximum level of assets, households save more and aggre-
gate capital increases, followed by an increase in output of 4.3%. I have not found
a large impact on revenue requirement, as the endogenous tax rate on consumption
decreases by one percentage point to sustain such reform.
In my second counterfactual exercise, I implement Andrew Yang’s proposal of UBI.
I let the level of transfers be of US$12,000 annualy to each agent in the economy. In
this scenario the tax rate on consumption needs to increase 32 percentage points in
order to balance the government’s budget. The aggregate response of the economy is
a contraction of both capital and output. The second UBI reform increases the Gini
coefficient for pre-tax earnings mostly due to the selection mechanism arising from
the high productivity agents that remain in the labor force and are able to buffer
consumption through higher level of savings. There is some redistribution in both
counterfactuals towards the bottom 20%, driven by a reduction of the means accrued
by the middle-class. At the transition the small UBI transfer reduces consumption
inequality whereas the large-scale program significantly redistributes consumption
acrual from the top to bottom quintiles.
The welfare system under the expenditure-neutral UBI yields a welfare loss of
-0.24% in Consumption Equivalent Variation relative to the initial means-tested wel-
fare system. The UBI economy achieves a lower welfare than the current IS system in
early ages when households have children but then exhibits a higher welfare in later
ages and a lower variance of consumption during the retirement years. Alternatively,
the generous UBI transfer improves welfare in 1.22%, exhibiting gains for all decade
averages of households alive during the transition.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Data - SIPP 2008
In this section I outline the empirical evidence obtained from the the 2008 panel of
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a represen-
tative sample of the civilian United States population and provides information on
earnings, transfers from different U.S. income security programs, a fine breakdown
of households’ balance sheet and detailed demographics which are used in the cal-
ibration of the model for the U.S. economy. The SIPP is the natural candidate of
household survey data for this paper’s question as it has detailed questions for many
of the programs designed to target this stratum of the population.
The 2008 panel consists of 16 waves for which interviews are conducted every
4 months. The sample selection used spans through May 2008 to December 2013,
and is observed monthly. I deflate all values with the CPI for the last month in my
sample and restrict the observations units to be at the household level in which the
head of the household age is between 20 and 65. In the SIPP, I use the classification
reference person to follows observation units. I guide the empirical documentation
following a methodology similar to the one used in Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner
(2014) and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2015), in which authors characterize several mea-
sures of inequality in different household survey datasets. In particular, I construct
equivalent definitions of Net Iliquid and Net Liquid Wealth from Kaplan, Violante,
and Weidner (2014) for the SIPP questionnaire. The data for assets is taken from
the Topical Modules of the 2008 Panel. I cross-check with their estimates and find
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similar qualitative patterns and orders of magnitude.
Summary Statistics
The Table 1.13 below displays the summary statistics for my sample:
Table 1.13: Sumarry statistics. Source: SIPP 2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Earnings 5,952.1 5,855.7 1.0 137,984.6
Income 6,698.3 5,964.5 -5,163.9 139,644.9
Cash Transfers 36.4 206.5 0.00 5,239.1
Net worth 242,136.7 806,620.6 -729,020.1 1,903,800
Net liquid wealth 193,187.4 269,582.1 -453,567.4 2,427,526
Checking accounts 133.0 688.5 0.00 8,099.4
Bonds 260.6 2,067.8 0.00 32,397.8
Credit cards 907.7 2,650.8 0.00 16,198.9
Loans 747.5 7,041.0 0.00 125,000.0
Debt 759.6 4,324.7 0.00 48,596.74
Tables 1.14 and 1.15 below characterize the percentiles partition for the distribu-
tion of several statistics.
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Table 1.14: Distribution for the SIPP 2008 panel.
Percentiles 1 5 10 25 50
Earnings 195.3 695.6 1,177.6 2,334.6 4,439.4
Income 517.9 1,287.7 1,796.8 3,054.9 5,192.1
Net worth -70,007.4 -2,809.9 159.7 10,579.1 90,092.4
Net liquid wealth -45,000.0 -12,912.3 -5,399.6 -186.3 0.0
Net illiquid wealth -75,054.9 0.0 0.00 0.00 91,557.3
Table 1.15: Distribution for the SIPP 2008 panel (continued).
Percentiles 75 90 95 99 Gini
Earnings 7,736.7 11,927.6 15,428.5 32,886.0 0.44
Income 8,510.2 11,2731.5 16,300.4 33,486.1 0.43
Net worth 302,189.8 651,205.9 964,770.5 185,131,1 0.70
Net liquid wealth 0.0 77.4 917.9 7,984.6 –
Net illiquid wealth 276,461.4 548,279.5 761,348.9 1,208,344 0.70
Table 1.16 below displays the correlations between the statistics calculated.
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Table 1.16: Joint distribution for the SIPP 2008 panel.
Earnings Income Net worth Liq. wealth Illiq. wealth Transfers
Earings 1.00
Income 0.9874 1.00
Worth 0.4027 0.4344 1.00
Liq. wealth -0.0889 -0.0849 -0.0086 1.00
Illiq. wealth 0.4057 0.4373 0.9994 -0.0263 1.00
Transfers -0.0837 -0.0390 -0.0575 0.0139 -0.0580 1.00
1.A.2 Estimation of the Wage Process
I annualize the monthly data on labor earnings from the SIPP 2008 in order to
estimate the idiosyncratic income risk present in the model. I run the regression on
log wages in equation (1.20) below and obtain the income residuals used in the GMM
estimation.
logWijt = c+ Dt + Eijt + ν
′Aijt + wijt (1.20)
where i stands for household, Wijt are wages obtained dividing earnings by hours
worked, c is a regression constant, Dt are time dummies for the years of observation
2008-2013, Eijt are dummies that control for two levels of schooling - less or equal
than high school college degree and some college or above degree -, and Aijt stands
for a cubic polynomial on years of potential labor market experience, which are tied
to age. Table 1.17 shows the result for the Mincerian regression.
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Number of Households 34,653
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010), I assume stationarity and
postulate that the log residuals follow a process with persistent and transitory shocks,
z and η, respectively:
wi,j = ηi,j + zi,j, ηi,j ∼ N(0, σ2η), zi0 ∼ N(0, σ2z0) (1.21)
zi,j+1 = ρzi,j + εi,j, εi,j ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (1.22)
The parameters from this process can be identified in levels by the theoretical
moments. More precisely, ρ is identified by the slope of the autocovariance of z at
lags greater than 0; σ2ε and σ
2
η are both identified by the difference between variance
and autocovariance of u, and σ2z0 can be obtained residually from var(zi,0).
I drop households with non-positive earnings ending with a sample of 1.2 mm ob-
servations with which I conduct an over-identified GMM estimation using the identity
matrix, as the weighting matrix Ω15. Table 1.18 below shows the obtained estimates.
Table 1.18: Estimation of the income process.





Identity 0.9342 0.0176 0.3595 0.3975
1.A.3 Calibration of Means-Tested Programs
The model uses three different types of means-tested transfers with parameters that
require mapping to the data: the EITC, the SNAP/TANF, and the SSI. I will explain
15The suggestion can be found in Guvenen (2009), that uses this matrix as it a standard in the
literature for small sample estimations.
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in detail how I proceed for each parameter of each program.
The requirements for the EITC are defined by the IRS. First, there are the Earned
Income limits that allow households to be eligible for the program. In the model they
are defined by the variable ȳkTC , which depends on the number of children present
in the household nk,j. I define these quantities in terms of model units as shares of
GDP per households. As households have unit mass, this simply means shares of the
final good Y . For example, the total Earned Income limit in 2019 for a taxpayer
filing as a head of household with one child is US$41,094. Assuming a GDP per
capita in the U.S. of $60,000, this yields 25.95% of GDP. In the model then, I define
ȳ
nk,j=2
TC = 0.26 ∗ Y . As in the simulated economy there is no notion of marriage
and the data used in the SIPP is based on a sample in which the observation unit
is characterized by the reference person, I use the data for taxpayers filing as head
of household in the case of the EITC. An analogous procedure is then used for the
subsequent thresholds depending on the number of children.
The limit on investment income, d̄TC , is, as of 2019, is US$3,600 and independent
on the number of children in the household. For this parameter, my preferred choice
of mapping is in relation to average assets per capita, A. As I will use a similar
calculation for the assets-testing of the other programs, I will map them to the mean
Equity in 401k and Thrift savings accounts calculated for my sample of the SIPP
data. The limit is then exactly 9.81% of this value. As A is an endogenous variable
in the model and it is more tractable to define the threshold on assets exogenously,
I solve the model several times and set a value that with some certainty lies close
to the one calculated for the threshold in the data. At the final steady-state for the
benchmark economy, the restriciton on assets for the EITC is approximately 9% of
average assets. Table 1.19 below collects all the aforementioned parameters.
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Table 1.19: EITC parameters.
# Children d̄TC Target ȳTC Target
nk,j = 0 0.18 ≈ 9% of A 0.13 ≈ 26% of Y
nk,j = 1 0.18 0.36 ≈ 69% of Y
nk,j = 2 0.18 0.45 ≈ 87% of Y
nk,j = 3 0.18 0.48 ≈ 93% of Y
The phase-in and phase-out rates κ1 and κ2 are independent of units and are thus
taken exactly as the ones defined by the IRS for 2019. The phase-in level y multiplied
by the phase-in rate yields the maximum credit amount at each child level. For
example, for a taxpayer filing as a household with no children, the maximum credit
is US$529 per year and ynk,j=0 is US$6,920, which is approximate 11% of GDP per
capita. Both the phase-in and phase-out levels are similarly defined in terms of
percentages of Y 16. Table 1.20 collects all remaining details of the parametrization
of the EITC.
Table 1.20: EITC parameters (continued).
# Children κ1 κ2 Target y Target ȳ Target
nk,j = 0 0.0765 0.0765 IRS 0.06 ≈ 11% of Y 0.07 ≈ 14% of Y
nk,j = 1 0.3400 0.1590 0.8 ≈ 16% of Y 0.15 ≈ 30% of Y
nk,j = 2 0.4000 0.2100 0.12 ≈ 24% of Y 0.16 ≈ 32% of Y
nk,j = 3 0.4510 0.2100 0.12 ≈ 24% of Y 0.16 ≈ 32% of Y
16All details regarding the numbers and limits here used can be found at this IRS link and at this
link from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
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The cash transfers parameters are defined in a similar fashion. First, it is im-
portant to notice that recently there has been a change in the requirements of assets
limits for SNAP and TANF. By 2018, 37 states abolished the test for food stamps and
eight for the TANF (Wellschmied, 2020). As I am bundling both programs together,
I keep the assets means-testing with the constraint d̄CT . In the tax code this test is
made on households’ resources which vary by program. I will keep the mapping with
the 401k accounts used before for the EITC. Currently, for SNAP, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) defines a maximum of US $2,250 in countable resources
or US$3,500 if at least one member of the household is of age 60 or older. A recent
study by the PEW Charitable Trusts identifies that more than half of the States in
the U.S. use a threshold between US$1,000 and US$2,500. I choose US$2,500 which
is 7% of the average equity in the SIPP sample and proceed in the same way of the
EITC to map it to about 7% of A in the benchmark economy17.
For the income limit ȳCT , I use the value defined by the USDA for maximum
gross income for a household of size 2. This maps in the model to about 40% of Y . I
proceed in the same way for the annual benefit tSNAP . The USDA defines a monthly
benefit of US$355, which compounds annualy to approximately 7% of the GDP per
capita. Table 1.21 below summarizes the information for the SNAP/TANF transfers.
Table 1.21: Cash transfers parameters.
Test d̄CT Target ȳCT Target tSNAP Target
Value 0.12 ≈ 7% of A 0.20 ≈ 40% of Y 0.03 ≈ 7% of Y
17The website of the USDA that defines all criteria for SNAP from 2019 to 2020 can be found in
the following link. The website with the PEW study about limits on family assets in the context of
the TANF can be found in this link.
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Finally, the only remaining program is the SSI, which in the model environment
is only attainable during retirement. The SSI is tested only on resources, which in
this case do not count households’ house or vehicles. The maximum defined by the
Social Security is US$2,000 for an individual and US$3,000 for a couple. I map that
as approximately 6% of A. The monthly benefit rate defined by the SS is US$771 for
an individual and US$1,157 for a couple. However, the SSI benefit suffers deductions
if the household receives SS pensions. In the model all retired households receive a
benefit b(xt) equal to 36% of the average income of the simulated economy, which
amounts to the equivalent of US$2,160 monthly. If I were to follow directly the
deduction schedule, households would not receive any SSI benefits. As a compromise,
I set tSSI as 1% of Y , yielding a monthly transfer of US$65
18. Table 1.22 below shows
all values used for the SSI.
Table 1.22: SSI parameters.
Test d̄SSI Target tSSI Target
Value 0.110 ≈ 6% of A 0.006 ≈ 1.3% of Y
1.A.4 Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 2 (Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A stationary recur-
sive competitive equilibrium with population growth for this economy is an allocation
of value functions {v(s), vR(s)}, policy functions, prices {w, r}, an age-dependent but
time-invariant measure of agents Φ, transfers and taxes such that:
18The website of the SS for the resources criteria for the SSI can be found via this link. For the
rules regarding the benefit rates one can go to this link .
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1. The value functions {v(s), vR(s)} and policy functions {a′(s), c(s), l(s)} solve
the households’ optimization problems (1.14) and (1.15), given the factor prices
and initial conditions;
2. The individual and aggregate behaviours are consistent:
G = gyY, B = gbY
(1 + gn)K =
∫
S








exp(θ + zj)h(s)`(l(s))dΦ (s−j, {1, . . . , JR − 1})
3. {r, w} are such that they satisfy the firm’s first-order conditions (2.5) and (2.6);
4. The final good market clears:
C + (gn + δk)K +G+ CC = AK
αL1−α




[TTC(s) + TCT (s)] dΦ + (r − gn)B =∫
S
[









dΦ (s−j, {JR, . . . , J})





(1− ψj+1)a′ (s) dΦ (s)




M(s, ω)dΦ, ∀ω ⊂ B(S)
where M : (S,B(S))→ (S,B(S)), can be written as folllows: ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , J},
M(s, ω) =
πz,z
′ · ψj+1 , if a′(s) ∈ A, h′(s) ∈ H, k ∈ K, θ ∈ Θ, j + 1 ∈ {2, . . . , J}
0 , otherwise.
and for j ∈ {1},




pk · pθ , if 0 ∈ A, h0 ∈ H, z̄ ∈ Z
0 , otherwise,
where pk and pθ are, respectively, the probabilities of being a household with chil-
dren and of drawing θ out of its discretized distribution. The initial conditions
are a0 = 0, h0 = 1, and z̄, the average level of productivity.
1.A.5 Welfare Calculation
In this section I describe in detail how to derive the consumption equivalent variation
that quantifies the welfare costs of the UBI reforms. I follow steps analogous to the
ones in Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016b).
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The procedure consists basically of computing lifetime utility and how it changes
if, at any point in time t and for every state of the world it is scaled by a factor of
1 +g. Denote the lifetime utility of a age j = 1 household with individual state-space
s−j by v(s−j, j = 1) and the lifetime utility of the scaled-up consumption sequence
by s−j by v(s−j, j = 1; g)
19.
First, we find the lifetime utility using the functional form for the utility function
described in the calibration:





























Now applying the scalling factor we have that:
19Here I borrow the typical notation in game theory that, given a vector v with arbitrary entries
i ∈ I, we denote the same vector but excluding specific entry i0 by v−i0 .
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log(1 + g) + v(s−j, j = 1) (1.26)
If we ask the question by what percentage g do we need to increase consumption
in the initial stationary equilibrium for the households to be indifferent between living
in the old equilibrium and the new one, we are simply finding the g that solves the
following equality:
vMT (s−j, j = 1; g) = v
UBI(s−j, j = 1) (1.27)
where vMT denotes that the equilibrium value function is relative to the initial means-
tested steady-state and vUBI denotes the one associated with the new steady-state
under one of the UBI counterfactuals. Using equations (1.26) and (1.27), we can
characterize the factor g:
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log(1 + g) + vMT (s−j, j = 1)
(1.28)
=⇒ g(s−j, j = 1) = exp












which is defined for a newborn household with characteristics s−j. If we want to
evaluate the consequences of the reform under the veil of ignorance, i.e., before any





vUBI(s−j, j = 1)dΦ (s)−
∫
S











Finally, in order to make the same evaluation but taking into account the tran-
sition, we perform the same thought experiment but considering the comparison be-
tween a previous steady-state and the enacted period of the reform. Denoting vMT∞
the value function associated with the starionary equilibrium under means-testing
and vUBIt=1 the value function under the new UBI regime but at the period that the
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vUBIt=1 (s−j, j = 1)dΦt=1 (s)−
∫
S












1.A.6 Computation of the Model
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
I solve for the households’ problem by backward induction. The algorithm is similar
to the one in Fabian Kindermann and Krueger (2018). Households surviving to the
last period J have an immediate solution as vRt (s−j, J + 1) = 0. Aggregate quantities
and prices are found by taking the following steps:
1. Guess initial values for Kt, Lt, τc,t, and τSS,t;
2. Given such initial values, use the firm’s first-order conditions to obtain rt and
wt;
3. Given prices and policy parameters, set value function after the last age to 0
and solve the value function for the last period of life for each point of the grid.
This yields policy functions and value functions over retirement vRt (s);
4. Also given prices and policy parameters, solve for the household’s decision rules
by backward induction and value function iteration repeating it until the first
period of life;
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5. Use forward induction to compute the associated distribution of households
using the policy functions starting from the known distribution at the beginning
of the life cycle;
6. Use the equilibrium conditions to update the values of the guessed variables
and to compute all other aggregate variables;
7. Use dampening to obtain the new values for Kt and Lt, check the whether the
associated markets clear;
8. Iterate until convergence.
Details of the computation
I discretize all continuous dimensions of the state-space: assets, human capital, pro-
ductivity shocks, and permanent ability levels. I do so in 300, 50, 5 and 2 points,
respectively. The children component is a binary index k ∈ {0, 1}, and the age list
j ∈ {1, . . . J} has 80 points. The transition is assumed to converge in 45 periods,
adding the associated number of points. I also discretize the labor choice in 50 points
and use brute force grid search in the intra period decision of the household’s labor
supply. I include an extra loop for precision on evaluation of the extensive margin.
The value function iteration to find the choice of next period’s optimal assets is also
done by brute force grid search. I use a grid with more nodes at the lower end. I also
explore monotonicity and the envelope condition to increase efficiency. The household
problem is solved taking advantage of single-node parallelization with OpenMP. As
there are values for the human capital allocation that lie outside of the state-space
defined by the grids, I use linear interpolation in order to find indices for the next pe-
riod’s value function and the stationary distribution. Following Fabian Kindermann
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(1 + ga)299 − 1
(1.32)
where ā is the upper bound of the discrete space which is chosen such that no house-
hold saves more than this amount and ga > 0 is the growth of the distance between
points. I have profited and adapted from several sources in the writing of the code
for this project, some of those were Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura (2016) and
Fehr and F. Kindermann (2018).
1.A.7 Life-Cycle Profiles
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2.1 Introduction
Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs have attracted the attention of the economic
literature both because of its moral hazard component and its widespread presence in
many modern economies (Dhushyanth and Vodopivec, 2002). The design of such pro-
grams are usually characterized by three main elements: a replacement ratio, which is
the percentage from a past wage which the worker receives during the unemployment
spell, a limit of how many months the worker can collect such benefits, and some type
of requirement related to the worker’s labor market history that deems them eligible




how UI requirements in the U.S. affect the labor market and compute what is their
optimal level.
The replacement ratio is the typical policy instrument employed to overcome
the moral hazard disencentive channe of UI while keeping the insurance value of
the benefits. By reducing or making the ratio decreasing during the unemployment
tenure, workers can be encouraged to either keep their current jobs, had they been
thinking of quitting, or stay less periods in the unemployed state, thus incentivizing
the acceptance of new offers (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997). We depart from this
classical result of the literature by shifting the focus to the eligibility requirements.
In U.S. states in particular, unemployed workers must satisfy one or two specific
requirements: a tenure requirement, i.e., a minimum amount of periods formally
enrolled on a job in order to be eligible for the UI, and a monetary requirement,
which establishes a minimum weekly wage earned by the worker in its previous job
in order to be enrolled in the program. One of the main issues often raised in the
UI literature that motivates the use of these instruments is the lack of information
by the policy maker. The government has a limited capacity to observe the amount
of effort that the unemployed agent exerts to find a new job, how much effort she
makes to keep her current job, or even how many offers of other jobs are arriving to
that worker. Even though there is this potential inefficiency, the literature has often
found programs such as the UI to be welfare-improving. The intuition is simple, in
the case of incomplete markets, as the UI works as a state-contingent instrument that
helps households smooth consumption in a state of the world where they need the
most, unemployment. Our analysis then asks the question of which of the instruments
associated with the UI can maximize welfare in an incomplete markets environment.
We first conduct an empirical analysis to assess the UI requirements effects on
employment outcomes and obtain stylized facts that we rationalize with our quanti-
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tative exercises. Following an approach similar to Hagedorn, Manovski, and Mitman
(2016b), we use discontinuities in the UI policies to identify the causal effect of the UI
requirements on the labor market. We use fixed effects at the Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) level and find that the monetary requirement has a stronger effect on
disincentivizing UI benefit applications. The intuition for this result comes from the
fact that a tenure requirement does not influence workers to stay at the same job as
any position helps qualifying for the program, whereas the monetary requirement in-
centivizes workers to keep high-paying jobs. This result is corroborated by a similar
effect with opposite signs for the coeffcients of the requirements, with the positive
effect stemming from the tenure eligibility constraint. We also find the same pattern
when the outcome variable is the number of employers that workers had in the year
previous to their application for the UI benefits.
In our quantitative analysis, we develop an infinite horizon partial equilibrium
model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. Workers have their indi-
vidual state-space defined by their holding of assets, their labor income and supply
histories, and their idiosyncratic productivity component. They make choices on
consumption, savings and their discrete labor supply. The model has embedded a
UI program that closely mimics the design in the US with its policy instruments and
requirements. As we assess the behavior of workers both in and out of the labor force,
agents receive employment and unemployment shocks, adding the associated possi-
bility of a involuntary unemployment state. On top of that, in order to account for
heterogeneity in benefits and the moral hazard component intrinsically attached to
the UI benefit, we include ad-hoc moral hazard and loss of benefit shocks. With this
shock structure, we are able to characterize a set of unemployed workers with defraud-
ing behavior towards the UI requirements. In the model economy, the government
administers the UI system and balance its budget with taxes, exogenous expenditures,
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and a universal unemployment transfer. Following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009)
and the repeated moral hazard literature, we add an informational friction in which
the government cannot perfectly distinguish quits from lay-offs.
In order to compute the model efficiently, we introduce a methodology to reduce
the infinite-dimensional state-space defined by the sequences of labor income and
supply histories. By focusing on the relevant part of such histories along with its
average values, we are able to rewrite the workers problem in a tractable manner
while still keeping it fully history-dependent and rich enough state to accomodate
the requirements details of the UI program. We bring the model to the data by
calibrating exogenous and endogenous parameters. We are able to successfully repli-
cate the targeted moments with our seven endogenous parameters as well as select
non-targeted moments that are relevant to deem the model valid for the analysis of
our research question. Furthermore, we observe that in our benchmark economy, the
overall behavioral response to adjustments in the UI policy parameters is consistent
with the evidence we collect in our empirical analysis. In particular, we are able to
recover the negative relation between the monetary requirement and the employment
outcomes and the associated positive impact of the tenure requirement.
Such association is obtained when we compute a sequence of counterfactual ex-
periments that analyze the effects on the economy of varying each of the UI policy
parameters on a coeteris paribus basis. In the results of our exercises, we also ob-
serve that a stricter monetary requirement significantly reduces the share of workers
entering the UI system that are not technically qualified to do so. The intuition for
this effect comes from the fact that the monetary requirement is able to precisely
preclude low productivity workers from having access to the UI benefits. Further-
more, a stricter requirement also incentivizes a higher share of workers to exhaust the
period for which they are entitled to receive the benefits. The tenure requirement, on
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the other hand, has negligible numerical impact in labor market outcomes subject to
moral hazard.
Finally, we conduct a normative analysis of the design of the UI program by
evaluating the model’s welfare response to different numerical values for the policy
instruments. More specifically, we maximize a utilitarian Social Welfare Function
(SWF) on a restricted Ramsey problem and assess the level of Consumption Equiv-
alent Variation (CEV) associated with the optimal parametric region for the tuple
that characterizes the program. We find that the highest level of welfare is achieved,
when evaluated separately, by a monetary requirement that is relatively larger than
the benchmark value. As only the low productivity households exhibits a signifi-
cant reaction to changes in the UI policy in their behavior towards the labor market,
the monetary requirement is more efficient in targeting workers in that region of the
distribution. The second highest level of welfare is achieved by a reduction in the
replacement ratio, though that augments the pool of beneficiaries which makes this
instrument less efficient on our restricted sense when compared to the monetary re-
quirement. Finally, optimizing the problem with a combination of both requirements,
including the one on tenure, is able to achieve an even higher level of CEV by fur-
ther reducing the total expenditure of the government with with a stricter tenure
requirement at the optimum.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the related
literature. Section 2.3, we show the empirical evidence obtained of the effect of UI
requirements on employment outcomes. In Section 2.4, we construct the setting of
our quantitative model, provide intuition about the underlying theory, and define all
relevant model objects. In the subsequent Section 2.5, we describe the calibration
used to map the model to the data. Section 2.6 presents the results for the bench-
mark economy and the properties of the initial steady-state. Section 2.7 lays-out the
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thought experiment and the results of counterfactual analyses. In Section 2.8, we
conduct a normative analysis and search for the optimal UI policy within the model
environment. The last section states our conclusions.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper builds on the literature that assesses numerically the effects of unemploy-
ment insurance policies in the labor market. One of the earliest and most influential
references is Hansen and Imrohoroğlu (1992), who constructs a quantitative incom-
plete markets model with moral hazard to anaylze the optimal replacement ratio. On
a similar environment but with a focus on the search-theoretic component, Gomes,
Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) study the welfare cost of business cycles. Pallage
and Zimmermann (2001) extends the same model setting for heterogeneity of skills
and studies the voting preferences towards UI generosity. Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu,
and Sahin (2002) moves one step further in the canonical framework by making the
unemployment insurance dependent on how much time the agent has been in an un-
employment state. They find out that the optimal UI has to decrease on time during
the unemployment spell and that it should be larger if agents are prevented from sav-
ing. We use this formulation as a reference starting point for the modelling strategy
used in this paper.
Still in the quantitative approach with heterogeneous agents, Young (2004) incor-
porates search effort in the numerical analysis in order investigate the heterogeneity
of optimal replacement ratios suggested by the literature. The author finds that
the optimal ratio should be zero independent of limits of benefit duration and that
eliminating the UI system generates welfare gains which get smaller if one takes the
transition into account. Lentz (2009) further confirms the importance of including
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transitional dynamics when effort choice is present by estimating a search model of
optimal UI policy with Danish data. Zhang and Faig (2012) study the eligibility to
UI in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides environment and find a Ricardian Equivalence
type of result in which taxation of risk neutral households anulates the job creation
effect of the employment requirement. A reference with a similar approach of quan-
titatively identifying the UI design in a heterogeneous agents economy but with an
endogenization of the labor market in a search and matching framework is the one
in Mukoyama (2013). On a more recent contribution but in an environment with
search, Mazur (2016) identifies large welfare gains from a policy that allows quitters
to receive UI benefits.
We contribute to this branch of the literature by developing quantitative model of
optimal unemployment insurance incorporating a fully history-dependent UI program.
We model that, to become eligible to the UI benefits, the agent must satisfy the
UI requirements, which test the households’ labor market history that needs to be
present in the workers’ states-space. Moreover, we focus on the optimality of such
requirements, a question that is, to the extent of our knowledge, still open in the
literature.
The empirical strategy used in our econometric evidence can be tied with what is
now a rich literature that analyzes changes in UI features in the context of recessions.
More specifically, the literature studies the extension of UI benefits that was granted
for up to 73 weeks during the Great Recession. We discuss the institutional back-
ground details in the section 2.3.1. Marinescu (2017), for example, studies the general
equilibrium effects of the extension on job applicants and vacancies. The methodology
of using discontinuity in state borders is also present in a sequence of papers that use
it to asses the labor market and equilibrium effects of the recession episode (Hagedorn,
Manovski, and Mitman, 2016b; Hagedorn, Manovski, and Mitman, 2016a; Hagedorn,
92
Karahan, et al., 2019). Recent quantitative and theoretical approaches studying the
relation between UI and recessions are Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) and Pei and
Xie (2020).
Our paper also dialogues with a long tradition of theoretical papers of optimal
unemployment insurance design. The earliest contribution can be found in the semi-
nal work by Shavell and Weiss (1979). Authors find that if workers have no influence
in their job finding probability the optimal payment schedule during the unemploy-
ment spell stays constant at a positive level. On the other hand, in an environment
where the worker can exert effort to find a job, a moral hazard problem arises and
the sequence optimal payments might fall during the period that the worker is un-
employed. The early work by Wang and Williamson (1996) find that an optimal
system with moral hazard would involve a tax and subsidy scheme penalizing the
transition from employment to unemployment and incentivizing the converse. An-
other canonic article is the one by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). The environment
is a repeated principal-agent problem where the principal cannot observe the agent’s
effort. The authors are able to characterize the optimal contract and lay-out a re-
sult which is currently well-known in the literature: the optimal payment schedule
involves a replacement ratio which is decreasing during the unemployment spell and a
reemployment wage tax that increasing with the length of such spell. Other seminal
references on the search incentives generated by the UI are Chetty (2008) and Shimer
and Werning (2008).
In close relation with our approach is the extension of the original article in Hopen-
hayn and Nicolini (2009). They amplify the environment to account for multiple
unemployment spells with asymmetric information in order to study the optimality
of the eligibility condition common in UI programs. The main result of the paper
is that, if the principal cannot distinguish quits from lay-offs, it is optimal for the
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principal to condition benefits payments on the agent’s past employment history. A
similar idea is present, though not as an endogenous outcome, but with an ad-hoc
formulation of the environment win the experience rating component used by Wang
and Williamson (2002). As in our environment we search for a quantitative design
of an UI program that is characterized by an eligibility condition, we will profit from
the result in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009) and assume that the government in our
model has the same informational limitation suggested assumed in their paper.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we study empirically how the UI requirements affect the labor market
in the U.S. In subsection 2.3.1 we briefly describe the institutional background of the
unemployment insurance in the different states. We describe our data in 2.3.2 and
the empirical strategy used in 2.3.3. We then outline the results of the econometric
exercises in 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Institutional Background
The unemployment insurance in the U.S. is regulated by the federal government, ad-
ministered by the States and paid weekly to workers who have been displaced of their
jobs by no fault of their own. The eligibility requirements beyond the determination
of reason for displacement are established by each individual State law in reference
to a base period which is usually the first four out of the last five completed calendar
quarters prior to the time the claim is filed. The majority of the states fund the
program through a tax imposed on employers 1.
1The U.S. Department of Labor provides further details on the legislation and broader compo-
nents of the UI regulation, the website can be found via this link.
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One of the last substantial revisions to the UI federal law has been in 2009 with
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which largely extended the duration
of benefits due to the Great Recession with the Emergency Unemployment Compen-
sation (EUC) and Extended Benefits (EB) measures. The baseline period for most of
the states was of 26 weeks, which were topped up with additional 13 to 20 weeks by
the Act. The most recent significant revision was in 2012 and extended the programs
from the previous revision and added legislation on self-employment eligibility and
short-term compensation possibility for employers. The EUC and EB were last ex-
tended until 2014. As mentioned previously, these revisions have focused solely on the
duration of payment of benefits and have received due attention from the literature2.
2.3.2 Data
We conduct our econometric analysis using data from the IPUMS repository of the
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey
(CPS) between 1963 and 2016. We combine the labor market statistics from this sam-
ple with data on state unemployment insurance laws taken from the U.S. Department
of Labor (USDL). The region of focus are the MSAs. A more detailed description
of the data can be found in Appendix 2.A.1. For the current analysis, we do not
perform any sample selection but rely on demographic controls in our regressions.
2.3.3 Empirical Strategy
We use state policy changes on UI requirements to identify their causal effect. The
peril of such approach is the possibility of state level shocks that correlate with such
policy changes. Those could be a threat to the correct identification of the effect. For
2See our review in Section 2.2.
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instance, if policymakers refrain from increasing UI requirements during recessions
or if they change tenure requirement accordingly to the state average job duration, a
traditional diff-in-diff strategy would be biased.
UI reforms are also potentially correlated with state specific trends: policy makers
are less likely to increase requirements in a crisis period (Hagedorn, Manovski, and
Mitman, 2016a). The intuition is that increases in employment duration make UI
tenure requirement less binding and hence political support for stricter requirements
might also increase. In order to deal with such potential issues, we use the disconti-
nuity of UI requirements at state borders. The idea behind is that MSAs at different
sides of a state border are subject to the same shock but to different UI policies.
The specification of our econometric model is:
yi,m,s,b,t = βMmonreqs,t + βT tenurereqs,t +X
′
i,m,s,b,tθ + µm + γb,t + εi,m,s,b,t (2.1)
where yi,m,s,b,t is a labor market outcome of agent i, at MSA m and state s, which
is a member of the border pair identified by b at time t. The monetary requirement
in state s at time t is monreqs,t while tenurereqs,t is the tenure requirement. Finally,
X ′i,m,s,b,t is a set of controls, µm is a MSA fixed effect while γb,t is a border-year fixed
effect. The set of controls used in our regression results are workers’ demographics,
more specifically, age, years of education, sex, race and marital status.
If shocks that lead to UI requirement changes are continuous over state borders, it
should affect the two sides of a border pair b, hence being captured by the fixed effect
γb,t. This guarantees the identification of the two coefficients of interest, βM and βT ,
which capture, respectively, the effects of the monetary and the tenure requirements.
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2.3.4 Results
We summarize our results using MSAs as our baseline region in Table 2.1. The
estimates obtained indicate that UI requirements affect the labor market outcomes
at a significant level. The requirements impact the kind of jobs individuals take,
specially those that are part-time but also the UI applications and their number
of jobs. Overall, the monetary requirement impacts the labor market employment
outcomes negatively and in an opposite direction to the tenure requirement.
Table 2.1: Results of econometric analysis at the MSA level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UI Last Year # Employers Last Year Part Time Duration Last Job
Dmonreq -0.0256*** -0.0121*** -0.133*** -0.991
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.240)
Dtenurereq -0.000567 0.0857*** 0.0270*** -0.449
(0.808) (0.000) (0.000) (0.569)
Region MSA MSA MSA MSA
Border-Year FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
N 222656 135764 149407 1449
R2 0.899 0.051 0.017 0.300
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Note: The variable D stands for a dummy indicating the presence of the requirement. Outcome variables for
regressions (1), (3), (4) are dummies indicating the ocurrence of the variable in the previous year. Outcome variable
for regression (2) is numerical and continuous. The results are shown for the coefficient of interest of a regression
with control variables for demographic characteristics.
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As can be seen in the Table 2.1 above, we find in the first regression that the
monetary requirement has a quantitatively stronger effect on disincentivizing UI ben-
efit applications than the tenure requirement. This result comes from the fact that a
tenure requirement does not necessarily influence workers to stay at the same job as
any position can contribute to the spell that qualifies the worker for the UI program.
The monetary requirement, on the other hand, incentivizes workers to stay in their
jobs or focus on high-paying positions. This result is corroborated by a similar effect
shown in the regression on the number of employers where there are opposite signs for
the coeffcients of the requirements and the tenure requirement exhibiting a positve
sign.
We also find the same pattern when the outcome variable is the whether or not
workers are on part-time employment. Once again, policy changes on the monetary
requirement affect negatively the outcome and in this case with a large effect. As
the monetary requirement directly establishes a minimum wage, it is soemewhat by
construction designed to preclude workers from temporary jobs to use these short
spells to qualify for the benefit. The tenure requirement, though also focused on
diminishing the disencentive of seach generated by the UI, has a positive effect on the
part-time employment as it does not directly helps in selecting the type of position
the unemployed workers enroll. Our last regression with the duration outcome has
not shown significant coefficients. We conduct a robustness check with regressions at
the county level3.
3The results can be found in Appendix 2.A.2.
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2.4 The Model
This section describes the dynamic partial equilibrium model we use to analyze the
optimal degree of unemployment insurance requirements in the U.S. economy. The
environment is an infinite horizon economy with incomplete markets and individual
heterogeneity, discrete labor supply, labor income and supply histories, and an UI
system that mimics the one of the U.S.
Households are heterogeneous with respect to their labor income history, ỹ =
{εw}∞j=0 ∈ Y∞, labor supply history, ñ = {nj}
∞
j=0 ∈ N
∞, their idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock, z ∈ Z, and their asset holdings a ∈ A. The state space of the economy
is then the set S = A×Z ×N∞×Y∞. In the subsections below, we discuss in detail
every entry of the individual state space element s = (a, z, ñ, ỹ) ∈ S.
As the environment is set with the the underlying purpose of assesing the opti-
mality of the UI system that will be analyzed only between steady-states, throughout
the description of the model, we will selectively omit indices in order to avoid load-
ing the notation. More specifically, we will denote all individual variables as defined
over the individual state-space s, hence should also be understood as implicitly in-
dexed by time t. As the aggregate variables are more naturally understood to be
time-dependent, we will explicitly index them by t. Furthermore, as there is no dis-
tincition between the notion of a household and a worker in the theoretical setting
of the model, we will interchangeably denote the agents of the model economy with
either of these terms.
2.4.1 Preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of households with a time-separable period
utility function. Households maximize their discounted expected lifetime utility from
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where β is the discount factor and E is the expectation operator. Households can
also choose to accumulate assets a ≥ b to protect themselves against the idiosyncratic
shocks, where b is their borrowing limit.
2.4.2 Technology
There is a single good produced in this economy with technology given by a Cobb-
Douglas production function that exhibits constant returns to scale, Y = F (Kt, Nt) =
Kαt N
1−α
t , where α ∈ (0, 1) is the output share of capital income and Yt, Kt and Nt
denote, respectively, aggregate output, physical capital and labor. The final good can
be consumed or invested in physical capital on a one-to-one basis.
The price of the consumption good is normalized to one and aggregate investment
in physical capital, It, is defined by the following law of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + It, (2.3)
where δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
This technology is used by a representative firm that behaves competitively max-
imizing profits at every period t by choosing labor and capital given factor prices.





t − wtNt − (rt + δk)Kt. (2.4)
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As the model economy is gonna be analyzed in partial equilibrium setting, the
interest rt will be given in the steady-state, with value r
∗. From that value we recover
Kt/Nt via equation (2.5) and thus, use equation (2.6) to determine the steady-state
wage level w∗.
2.4.3 Endowments and Labor Income
Agents are born with zero assets and endowed with one unit of time. There can be
two possible states for a household, employed or unemployed. In either case, the
household receives two types of shocks: an unemployment or employment shock and
a productivity shock, z. There is no aggregate uncertainty. The component z is
persistent and follows an AR(1) process defined by:
zt+1 = ρzt + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (2.7)
which is discretized in a Markov chain with transition matrix πz,z′ = Pr(zj+1 = z
′|zj =
z) and stationary distribution Π(z).
An employed worker with productivity z in the previous period receives at the
beginning of the current period an unemployment shock with probability pu and a
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a productivity shock z′ ∈ {z1, ..., zN} with probability Π̄(z′|z). While working, indi-
vidual earnings depend on the competitive wage wt and the idiosyncratic persistent
component. Workers pre-tax labor income is then defined by:
y(n, z) = w · z · n (2.8)
On the other hand, an unemployed household in the previous period receives at
the beginning of the current period an employment shock with probability pe and a
productivity shock z ∈ {z1, ..., zN} with probability Π̃(z′).
We interpret each different shock z > 0 as a given productivity in the same
job and assume that if z = 0 the agent is laid-off. Hence, in accordance to the
current U.S. unemployment insurance code, agents with z > 0 should not receive
the unemployment benefit, while only agents with z = 0 and attending the required
eligibility criteria are able to collect it. We relax this hypothesis later on in order to
capture the moral hazard component. Without loss of generality, we can collapse all
shocks in one vector and rewrite the effective labor income process as Π(z′|z), where
z′ ∈ {0, z1, ..., zN}.
2.4.4 Unemployment Insurance and Moral Hazard
The unemployment insurance program is designed to approximate the regulation in
the US. Let bUI (ñ, ỹ) be the UI benefit of an agent with labor market history (ñ, ỹ).
The government pays UI benefits benefits bUI , which amount to a percentage of
the average past earnings characterized by a replacement ratio θ ∈ [0, 1]. It does so
for a limited amount of periods {0, . . . , µb}, with µb ∈ N. It requires a minimum
amount of consecutive periods working for eligibility to the program, µt ∈ N, as well
as a minimum threshold zmin ∈ R+ on the workers’ average earnings. Thus, the
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UI design is defined by the tuple {θ, zmin, µt, µb}. We make the assumption that, in
the model economy, every worker satisfying all requirements of the UI program will
automatically receive the program benefits. That is equivalent to a take-up rate of
100%.
In order to capture the moral hazard component intrinsically embedded in the
design of the UI, the workers will be subject to two ad-hoc shocks. First, there is a
strict moral hazard shock : with probability ϕ, workers quitting the labor force, i.e.
with n = 0 and z > 0, receive UI benefits. Second, in order to the model to be
consistent with heterogeneity in benefit duration, there is an exogenous loss of benefit
shock : with probability ϕexo the unemployed agent loses its UI benefit.
Finally, following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009) we impose an extra informa-
tional limitation to the government, which is implicit in the moral hazard structure
of the model environment. We assume that the government and workers are in a
principal-agent relation in which the former cannot perfectly distinguish quits from a
layoffs. This is the exact condition that guarantees the eligibility requirement to arise
as part of the optimal mechanism in the repeated moral hazard environment that
is analyzed by the authors. Moreover, as the government does not observe whether
a worker is defrauding the UI system due to the moral hazard shock, it also cannot
perfectly distinguish her from an unemployed worker.
2.4.5 Government
The governments runs the UI system and its budget. The total revenue and expen-
diture of the UI system are defined, respectively, by RevUI,t and ExpUI,t. On top
of that, the government issues a Social Security transfer Tu,t paid to all unemployed
households. There is an endogenous level of aggregate expenditure Gt, which is de-
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fined residually by what is left to balance the total government’s budget. Finally, It
taxes labor income with exogenously calibrated flat rate τ using the collected revenue
to fund all expenses.
The universal transfer Tu in this context is important for two reasons: First,
it accounts for the fact that the government has other financial duties beyond its
expenditures on the unemployment insurance. Second, as the government provides
insurance through other welfare and social programs, it is auxiliary in interpreting
the numerical results derived through the paper as accounting for the redistribution
desire and risk protection provided by the UI that exists on top of the these programs.
This transfer works then as a reduced-form version of the transfer that households in
the US have access via the Income Security System.
At any point in time t, the government’s budget is balanced if, and only if:
Gt + Tu,t + ExpUI,t = τ(rKt + wNt) +RevUI,t (2.9)
2.4.6 Timing
In each period t the following sequence of events happens: workers enter the period
having received their labor market transition and productivity shocks. The final good
market opens, and the government pays UI benefits. Then workers receive the moral
hazard shock and the UI benefit loss shock. Given all these shocks, all agents make
their consumption and savings choices. Subsequently, if employed and without a
separation shock, they make their choice on whether to remain working or quit. If
unemployed, they make the choice whether to remain unemployed or to initiate at
work. If employed and having received an unemployment shock they collect benefits
while deciding their allocations. If unemployed and having received no job offer, they
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behave analogously. At the end of the period, the government collects its revenues
and balance its budget.
2.4.7 Recursive Household Problem
Let vn be the value function of an agent conditional on its labor supply decision
n ∈ {0, 1}. As defined previously, the individual state-space is s = (a, z, ñ, ỹ). The
problem of this agent is thus represented in the recursive form in the Bellman equation
(2.10) below:
vn(a, z, ñ, ỹ) = max
c,a′
u(c, n) + βEz [vn(a′, z′, {ñ, n}, {ỹ, wzn})]
s.t. (2.10)
c+ a′ = (1 + (1− τ)r)a+ (1− τ)wzn+ (1− n)Tu + (1− n)bUI (ñ, ỹ)
c > 0, a′ ≥ b, n ∈ {0, 1}
The solution of the problem above defines consumption and asset allocations con-
ditional on state s. Given these allocations, we can determine the final value function
and the labor supply decision by the following maximization:
v(a, z, ñ, ỹ) = max{v1(a, z, ñ, ỹ), v0(a, z, ñ, ỹ)} (2.11)
The solution of the dynamic programs (2.10) and (2.11) provides us the decision
rules for the asset holdings a : S → R+, consumption c : S → R++, and labour supply
n : S → {0, 1}.
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2.4.8 Reduction of the State-Space
In the previous sections we have described the elements of the workers’ state-space s.
We have kept the notation initially introduced for exposition purposes and to make it
simpler to write down the recursive household problem. Nonetheless, the state-space
contains the agents’ full labor supply and income history (ñ, ỹ) which are infinite
dimensional objects in the steady-state of the model. Hence, in the way we have the
problem defined so far it is, by construction, untractable for a numerical solution.
In this subsection we explain how we make a reduction of the state-space to make
the problem feasible. The principle behind the arithmetic we describe lies on only
keeping track of the agents’ relevant labor supply history and average earnings.
First we need to reduce the size of the agents’ labor supply history ñ. Given
that the UI program needs to keep track of how many periods the agent has been
working, the effective time span needed in the state-space at any period t is completely
determined and sized by the minimum tenure requirement µt. Hence, the agent
satisfies this requirement if n` = 1 for all ` ∈ {t − µt − 1, ..., t − 1}. Denote n̄ =
{n`}t−1`=t−µt the agent’s relevant labor supply history.
In our description before, the algebraic formula of the benefit was omitted due to
the many layers and implicit calculations. In order to make one of these layers explicit,
we introduce an extra, albeit numerically redundant, variable m, standing for the
number of periods the worker has been receiving UI. The set {bUI > 0}∩{0 < m < µb}
determines whether the agent satisfies all conditions to receive the benefit next period.
We can then compute the next period’s benefit eligibility in terms of periods received
using the following law of motion:
mt+1 = (mt + 1)1{bUI>0}∩{0<m<µb} (2.12)
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where the notation 1 stands for the indicator function. With the variables introduced
above, we then have reduced all relevant information from labor supply history ñ into
(n̄,m)
In order to tackle the reduction of dimensionality of the agents’ labor income
history ỹ, we construct the variable ȳ. It captures the average labor income history





















Which can be updated recursively as







With this summary statistic, we can implement a reduction of the state space from
the labor income history ỹ to ȳ.
The set {n` = 1, ∀n` ∈ n̄} ∩ {0 < m < µb} ∩ {ȳ ≥ zmin} is thus able to fully
determine whether the agent satisfies all requirements to receive the benefit at the
period and we can then define an indicator function 1 over it. This allows us to write
a proper algebraic characterization of the formula for the UI benefits bUI (ñ, ỹ) as it
is implemented in quantitative solution of the model:
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bUI(n̄,m, ȳ) = θ ȳ 1{n`=1, ∀n`∈n̄}∩{0<m<µb}∩{ȳ≥zmin} (2.15)
It is important to notice that, following US tax regulations, the benefits are subject
to income taxation. Hence, when we update the next period’s income ȳt+1 according
to the law of motion in (2.14), we are already including the post-tax income in the
state-space.
2.4.9 Partial Equilibrium
Agents are heterogeneous at each point in time in the state s ∈ S. The agents’
distribution among the states s is described by a measure of probability Φ defined on
subsets of the state space S. Let (S,B(S),Φ) be a space of probability, where B(S)
is the Borel σ-algebra on S. For each ω ⊂ B(S), Φ(ω) denotes the fraction of agents
that are in ω. There is a transition function M(s, ω) which governs the movement
over the state space from time t to time t + 1 and that depends on the invariant
probability distribution Π(z) and on the decision rules obtained from the household’s
problem. We define such distributional share as stationary when Φt+1 = Φt = Φ.
The definition below stands for a stationary equilibrium and I omit the arguments
of the distribution for notational convenience. Furthermore, for expositional purposes,
the definition is written using the notation assoaciated to the the full state-space as
initially defined in the description of the model.
Definition 3 (Stationary Recursive Partial Equilibrium). Given an UI program
{θ, zmin, µt, µb}, a tax τ , and exogenous prices {r∗, w∗}, a partial equilibrium for this
economy is an allocation of value function v, policy functions, residual expenditure
G, and universal transfer Tu, such that:
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1. Given prices {r∗, w∗}, the UI program, fiscal policy, and government transfer,
v solves the the workers’ problems in (2.10) and (2.11) and {c, a′, n}, are the
associated policy functions;








































M(s, ω)dΦ, ∀ω ⊂ B(S)
where M : (S,B(S))→ (S,B(S)), can be written as folllows:
M(s, ω) =

πz,z′ , if a




2.5.1 Timing, Preferences and Technology
We define the time period of the model to be equivalent to 6 weeks. The period utility





where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and χ controls the disutility of labor.
We calibrate the latter to match the average labor force participation (LFP) of the US
economy computed as the average between 1979 and 2014 taken from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics data for men 20 years or older. We set γ = 1, hence assuming log(c)
form throughout our numerical exercises. We endogenously calibrate β to match the
average wealth to income ratio in the US, which is taken from our own calculations
using the Survey of Consumer Finances of 2010 and 2013. (SCF).
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995) we set the capital share α to 0.36, a value
already standard in the literature. We exogenously set the partial equilibrium interest
rate r∗ to the six-week value that is equivalent to 2% per year. For the depreciation
rate of capital δ, we follow Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) and set it to the
six-week value that is equivalent to 5% per year.
2.5.2 Endowments and Labor Income
We prevent all workers’ from borrowing hence setting b = 0. We follow Gomes,
Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) and calibrate the the persistence ρ and the error vari-
ance σ2ε of the AR(1) process governing the labor income shock to 0.9 and 0.052,
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respectively. The probability of finding a job pe is calibrated endogenously to simul-
taneously match the average duration of UI benefits and the measure exhausting the
number of payments of the UI benefits. We also calibrate endogenously the probabil-
ity of loosing a job pu set to match average job destruction. Our target is based on
our calculation of job losers as a share of the population from 1991 to 2014 using the
data of the U.S. Department of Labor (USDL).
2.5.3 Unemployment Insurance and Government
The values for the parameters governing the UI system in the benchmark economy
are calibrated exogenously. The replacement ratio θ is set to 0.4641, which is average
of the U.S. average from 1989 to 2011 as provided by the USDL. The monetary
requirement zmin is defined exogenously to be 0.5573, which is the 4th largest shock
in the grid we use to discretize the AR(1) process in the computation. The maximum
number of weeks that workers receive the benefit µb is 24, which is the closest number
consistent with the average 26 weeks as reported by the U.S. Department of Labor.
This is equivalent to 4 model periods, which otherwise amount to 30 weeks, had we
considered 5 model periods. The same number of weeks is also required for households
to attain the work tenure eligibility requirement µt.
The remaining parameters are all calibrated endogenously. The universal transfer
Tu is calibrated to match the average transfer to unemployment over average labor
income in the data. The target level for this statistic is calculated by us from the
American Community Survey (IPUMS-ACS). The moral hazard shock ϕ is chosen
to target the share of agents receiving UI in the US. The reference value for this
moment is, once again, calculated from the average of the USDL data from 1991 to
2014. Lastly, the loss of benefit shock, ϕexo, together with pe mentioned previously,
targets the average duration of UI benefits and measure exhausting UI benefit.
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2.5.4 Summary of Calibration
We summarize the information associated with the calibrated parameters in the se-
quence of tables below. In Table 2.2, one can find the exogenously calibrated param-
eters and their sources. Table 2.3 shows the endogenously calibrated parameters, the
targeted moments associated with each of them, the source of such moments for their
data counterparts and the value of such statistics computed for the model economy.
Table 2.2: Exogenously calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value Target / Source
Timing
Model’s period t {1, . . .∞} 6 weeks (Hansen and Imrohoroğlu, 1992)
Preferences
Relative risk aversion γ 1.0 Standard
Technology
Capital share α 0.36 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
Interest rate r 0.002 ≈ 2% per year
Depreciation of K δ 0.006 ≈ 5% per year (Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo, 2001)
Labor Income
Persistence and variance of AR(1) {ρ, σ2ε} 0.900, 0.052 Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001)
Government and UI
Replacement ratio θ 0.4641 U.S Department of Labor
Monetary requirement zmin 0.5573 Exogenous
Maximum benefit periods µb 24 U.S. Department of Labor
Eligibility requirement µt 24 U.S. States Data
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Table 2.3: Endogenously calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value Target Data Model
Preferences and Government
Discount factor β 0.9974 Wealth/Income 2.5 2.5
Labor disutility χ 0.3343 Labor force participation rate 0.762 0.819
Transfer to unemployed Tu 0.049 Transfer to Unemp/Average Lab. Inc. 0.009 0.009
Labor Market Shocks
Probability of job offer pe 0.7977 Weeks receiving UI & shr. exhaust. UI 16 & 0.371 16.1 & 0.371
Probability of losing job pu 0.0031 Job destruction 0.028 0.028
Moral Hazard Shocks
Probability of UI benefit w/o being fired ϕ 0.078 Share of agents receiving UI 0.011 0.011
Probability of losing UI exogenously ϕexo 0.1975 Weeks receiving UI & shr. exhaust. UI 16 & 0.371 16.1 & 0.371
2.6 The Benchmark Economy
In Table 2.3 we have shown that the model is able to succesfully match the targeted
data moments. In particular, the relevant moments are exactly matched with the only
exception of the labor force participation rate which is about 6 percentage points
higher than in the data. This can be rationalized by the fact that the universal
transfer Tu determined by the calibration target is relatively small and households
only have the UI as a source of income beyond their own return to work. As in the
design of the UI there are explicit incentives for households to work, the structure
of the economy is one of which the forces towards labor force participation compete
directly with the preference for lesure.
In order to further understand the validation of our model, we show in Table 2.4
below some selected non-targeted model moments we consider relevant for our envi-
ronment to be well specified for the quantitative experiments. We can observe that
the model is able to closely replicate the mean unemployment duration and the share
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of workers excluded by the monetary requirement. Notice that the unemployment
duration is of around 22 weeks, with on average 8 weeks of duration more than the
average period in which workers receive the UI benefit. Hence, the model is able to
be precise about the dynamic behavior of the pool of unemployed workers in and out
of the labor market and of the insurance system.
The replication of the share of unemployed workers excluded from the benefit
by the monetary requirement is key to our analysis as we have exogenously set the
requirement zmin to an arbitrary small level defined by one the initial points in our
discretized shock process. As we match closely the 3.8% share of workers who fall
in this category, we can be reassured that for the current computation the monetary
requirement has the desired outcome within the model mechanism4.
Table 2.4: Non-targeted moments of the benchmark economy.
Statistic Model Data
Mean Unemployment Duration 22.77 22.50
UI Expenditure/GDP 0.55% 0.72%
Excluded by Mon. Req. 3.5% 3.8%
Excluded by Tenure Req. 2.9% 8.6%
The total expenditure by GDP is also at a level close to what is observed in the U.S.
data. This small size of the UI program is also able to be achieved by the existence
4The share of workers excluded by the monetary requirement in the data is calculated using the
CPS ASEC, being the only part of this survey that has data starting in 1962. For the number
shown in Table 2.4, specifically, we take data from the years 2000 to 2015 and merge with our
collected database for the monetary requirement. We then compare it to workers’ weekly earnings
and compute the share that are excluded by the threshold. More details on our calculation of the
minimum weekly earnings are described in Appendix 2.A.1
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of the universal unemployment transfer Tu, which helps households to have to the
correct amount of income and insurance. Hence, with income, job displacement, and
moral hazard shocks, the incompleteness of the market ends up self-selecting workers
into the UI program and hence achieving the size of the insurance that is given to
workers through that channel. Finally, the tenure requirement exclude fewer workers
than what is observed in the data.
In Figure 2.1 below we show the share of workers defrauding the UI program, i.e.,
the share of workers which receive a benefit without being rightfully entitled to do
so, by the different levels of the productivity shock. This state of the world is only
possible due to the existence of the moral hazard shock ϕ. The idea is to understand
what type of workers and jobs are effectively the ones subject to the moral hazard
component of the UI and which are the ones that are more likely targeted by the
program requirements.
Figure 2.1: Workers defrauding the UI program in the benchmark economy.
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One can see in the graph above that the majority of workers who are defrauding
the UI are those with low productivity shocks, specially the second and third lowest
levels in our calibration. This means that workers with such low productivity are
the ones that will seek the insurance component provided by the benefit as deem it
as more profitable than the wage they can receive in the market due to their low z.
This intuition is behind much of our analysis of the optimality as it is clear that the
monetary requirement is an instrument that can directly target this section of the
workers’ distribution.
2.7 Counterfactual Analyses
In this section we outline the results of the counterfactual exercises conducted high-
lighting the impacts on the moral hazard component, job-taking behavior and exhaus-
tion of UI benefits. First, we describe the thought experiments and the adaptations in
the model required to conduct the counterfactuals. Second, we analyze in subsection
2.7.2 the effect of all elements of the UI design on different types of employment. In
section 2.7.3, we discuss the results for the monetary requirement and in 2.7.4 we
analyze the effects of changing the tenure requirement.
2.7.1 Thought Experiment
The idea behind the counterfactual exercises of changing the design of UI can be
described as follows: we vary the value of policy instrument, say the monetary re-
quirement zmin, while keep all other parameters of the UI constant. Naturally, the
change of regime in this coeteris paribus fashion will affect the endogenous spending
and revenues of the UI budget. In order to impose discipline on the government ad-
ministration of the program, we keep Tu and G fixed at their benchmark’s numerical
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level. We then add and endogenous payroll tax τUI to finance any residual UI financ-
ing needs and close the government’s budget. The budget constraint of the household
then becomes:
c+ a′ = (1 + (1− τ)r)a+ (1− τ − τUI)wzn+ (1− n)Tu + (1− n)bUI (ñ, ỹ) (2.17)
We also need to update the buget constraint of the government under this new
regime to add the revenue accruing from the payroll tax τUI . As it becomes an














We then recover the notion of partial equilibrium of the model economy as described
in 2.4.9 by adding τUI as an endogenous equilibrium object to that definition and
substituting condition 3 by equation (2.18). The solution algorithm to find the partial
equilibrium now consists on iterating on the underlying fixed point defined by the
budget-clearing rate τUI .
2.7.2 Effects of the UI Design on Employment
In Figure 2.2 below, we show the effect of employment of varying each of the UI de-
sign parameters for two of the lowest levels of productivity. The reason we show only
for this range is that from the mid-level of the idiosyncratic shock the workers are
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productive enough so that they basically do not react to changes in the policy instru-
ments in a quantitatively significant manner. The three lowest level of productivity
are where we identify relevant behavioral responses.
First, we observe that the share of employed workers by type changes in a way
consistent with what was observed in the empirical correlations shown in Table 2.1.
Both the monetary and the tenure requirement exhibit in the model a sign and mag-
nitude of their impact that are in accordance to what we have measured in our
regressions. More specifically, the tenure requirement is positively associated with
employment outcomes whereas the monetary requirement impacts negatively the out-
comes. Moreover, the numerical order of magnitude also seem to be preserved, as the
tenure requirement has a smaller effect overall than the monetar requirement when
measured for the same statistic.
As the benchmark level, the monetary requirement is approximately 0.55. We can
then see in the top left panel that it is exactly where both lines cross the zero level. It
is possible to observe that the negative relation observed in the data also happens in
the model, as when the monetary requirement is made stricter, or higher, there is a
overall decrease of the employment rate, specially for the lowest level of productivity.
Though not monotone, the intuition follows that a looser monetary requirement for a
low productivity worker essentially makes the acces to the UI benefit easier which ends
up enlarging the option value of working, together with its built-in work incentives,
vis-a-vis the cost of supplying labor.
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Figure 2.2: Percentual variation on employment by type for different levels of UI
instruments.
Note: Lines are smoothed to facilitate graphical interpretation.
Second we can find an even clearer correlation when analyzing the relative changes
in employment due to the changes in the number of weeks of the tenure requirement.
Once again, as we start from 22 weeks, we can see in top right panel that both lines for
each of the productivity level cross zero at that number. Similarly to what observed
in our empirical evidence, the more demanding the tenure requirement, the highest is
the share of employment by type. The intuition for this result is straightforward, as
with a higher number of weeks required to be able to receive the UI benefits, workers
have an extra incentive to remain attached to the labor force. Aside from the lower
marginal cost of supplying labor, the benefits are based on the average past earnings,
hence the higher the productivity, even at the very bottom of the distributon, the
larger the incentive to work.
Overall, we can observe that the monetary requirement and the replacement ra-
tio have the strongest impacts on the employment rate when making changes from
the benchmark level. The replacement ratio has different effects depending on the
workers’ productivity. Among the ones depicted, we can observe that the higher the
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productivity the more positive the impact of a smaller replacement ratio on the em-
ployment share of that type. With a higher productivity, a worker has more incentive
to actually participate in the labor force if the UI benefit is a smaller fraction of
its earnings. Finally, the benefit duration µb has an unambiguous impact on work-
ers: the longer the duration of the payment stream, the smaller the incentive for the
households to work.
2.7.3 Moral Hazard and the Monetary Requirement
In Figure 2.3 below, we show, from top to bottom graph respectively, the effect of
changing the value of the monetary requirement on the workers defrauding the UI
benefits, the job opportunity and the measure of worker exhausting the number of
periods they are eligible to the benefit.
On the top graph, one can verify that a stricter monetary requirement, higher
zmin, overalll, reduces the share of workers that defraud the UI over the share of
workers entering the UI program. With the lowest possible requirement, such share
achieves a level in which about 50% of the workers receiving UI should not be able to
receive such benefits. Conversely, if we allow that level to be of the highest possible
idiosyncratic productivity, it is possible to decrease this share to zero.
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Figure 2.3: Moral Hazard and the monetary Requirement.
Note: Lines are smoothed to facilitate graphical interpretation.
The same inverse relationship happens with the share of workers receiving a job
opportunity. With a loose monetary requirement, several workers stay in the unem-
ployment state due to the possibility of collecting undue benefits and thus more than
10% of them are receiving the opportunities for the lowest values of the requirement.
Once again, by choosing the strictest possible value of the requirement, one can re-
duce such share to zero. Finally, the monetary requirement has positively correlated
with the share of households exhausting UI benefits. Though, the numerical range
of the effect on this measure is smaller than in the previously reported shares. From
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the last panel, it is clear that a stricter monetary requirement makes it increasingly
worthy for workers to use all the time span in which they are entitled to UI benefits,
as the chance of receiving them again is lower.
2.7.4 Moral Hazard and the Tenure Requirement
We repeat in Figure 2.4 below the same collection of outcome variables as before
but now with the variation of the tenure requirement. A longer tenure requirement,
i.e., a higher µt, has virtually no effect in all outcomes, which is shown by the small
percentage impact on the shares in the figures.
Despite the small quantitative impact, we can see in the bottom graph that the
measure of unemployed workers who exhaust completely their UI benefits increases as
we require more weeks of work to satisfy the tenure requirement. The same intuition
mentioned before for the monetary requirement applies: as the requirement gets
stricter, unemployed workers seizing their UI benefits realize it is better to stay in
that state until the last possible period in which the insurance is paid.
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Figure 2.4: Moral Hazard and the tenure Requirement.
Note: Lines are smoothed to facilitate graphical interpretation.
2.8 Optimal Policy Analysis
We conduct an optimal policy analysis by finding the UI design that maximizes welfare
on the economy described. In order to do so, we define a utilitarian Social Welfare
Function (SWF) dependent on all relevant policy parameters as follows:
W (θ, µt, µb, zmin) =
∫
v∗(a, z, n̄,m, ȳ | θ, µt, µb, zmin) dµ∗ (2.19)
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where {v∗, µ∗} are, respectively, value function and distribution associated with a
stationary partial equilibrium.
Our main goal is not to solve a full Ramsey problem by choosing an optimal
sequence of time-dependent policy instruments. Rather, we follow an approach similar
to the one used in Krueger and Ludwig (2016). We solve the result of a thought
experiment similar to what was already described in our analysis of the counterfactual
exercises.
Essentially, we hold constant the income tax τ and the expenditure components
G and Tu, as if they were fixed by the government at t = 0, and find the combination
of static UI policy parameters that optimize the social welfare function subject to it
being consistent with a stationary partial equilbrium. This set of partial equilibria to
which the planner restricts its attention to, will be the one defined by the households
optimization together with the government’s budget constraint balanced by τUI .




W (θ, µt, µb, zmin) (2.20)
where Γ is the restricted set of policies for which an associated sttionary partial
equilibrium exists.
We report the welfare gain in terms of the Consumption Equivalent Variation
(CEV). This measure defines the increment in consumption that we would need to
give households in each state of the world so that they would be indifferent between
their level of consumption in the alternative economies. We do so by calculating its
ex-ante value, hence under the veil of ignorance. It is defined for our environment as
follows:
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CEV (θ, µt, µb, zmin) = 100 ∗ {exp [(1− β) (W (θ, µt, µb, zmin)−Wbchmk)]− 1} (2.21)
whereWbchmk is the SWF associated with the benchmark partial equilibrium parametrized
according to Table 2.2.
We show the results in below Table 2.5 below. When optimized in each instrument
dimension separately, we can notice that the monetary requirement is the one yielding
the highest CEV. The intutition for this result comes from the fact that the monetary
requirement prevents households from low wage jobs, who have a high incentive to
quit in order to seize the benefit, to defraud the UI program. This is confirmed by
the fact that it exhibits the smallest number of beneficiaries of the program, hence
diminishing the overall moral hazard faced by the planner.
The second highest level of welfare gain is achieved through a large reduction of
the replacement ratio from the initial calibration. When comparing to the bench-
mark scenario, it becomes clear that the effect of such reduction does not have large
incentives on the number of workers that are receiving the benefits. However, it
sharply decreases the overall cost of the program with the lowest Expenditure/GDP
share of all other instruments at their optimal level. As we effectively find that the
budget-clearing rate τUI is negative, i.e., a transfer, the smaller size of the UI system
comes with an lower effective tax rate on payroll when accounting the wedge already
imposed by τ .
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Table 2.5: Optimal policies and statistics for each of the UI program instruments.
Data Replacement Ratio Benefit Duration Monetary Requirement Tenure Requirement Requirements
Optimal Policies
Replacement Ratio 0.46 0.15 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Benefit Duration 24 24 6 24 24 24
Monetary Requirement 0.54 0.54 0.54 1.29 0.54 1.29
Tenure Requirement 24 24 24 24 54 12
Statistics
CEV 0 0.83% 0.58% 0.88% 0.26% 0.99%
Expenditure/GDP 0.55% 0.18% 0.42% 0.31% 0.50% 0.22%
Beneficiaries 1.1% 1.07% 0.40% 0.25% 0.93% 0.27%
We can observe that the tenure requirement yields small welfare gains when con-
sidered separately, needing to be at a level of 50 or more weeks, beyond of what we
consider in the current computation of the model. Nonetheless, when combined with
the monetary requirement, the planner is able to recover the welfare gains by setting
the latter at the level associated with the coeteris paribus optimal. At the same time
though, the planner is able to increase the welfare gains by lowering the tenure re-
quirement to half of what is the benchmark level. This result happens because with
a high monetary requirement and low-wage workers defrauding behavior ruled out,
a lower tenure requirement yields less workers exhausting their UI benefits as they
anticipate they will be able to seize this policy again by taking another job offer with
a less restrictive application for the program in the future.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the question on what are the optimal levels of the two
types of requirements used in the UI benefits program in the US. We have developed
an infinite horizon partial equilibrium model with incomplete markets and heteroge-
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nous agents that includes a UI system that closely mimics the rules observed in the
data. The model has a rich individual state-space that includes workers’ assets, id-
iosyncratic shocks and labor supply and income histories. Furthermore, the economy
has a structure of shocks that allows the existence of a moral hazard component akin
to the one studied in the theoretical literature about optimal UI design. The focus on
our analysis lied on the impacts of changes in the UI policy instruments on workers’
labor market outcomes.
We conducted an empirical analysis to assess the UI requirements effects on em-
ployment outcomes and obtained stylized facts for our quantitative exercises. We
used discontinuities in the UI policies to identify the causal effect of the requirements
on different labor market outcomes. The monetary requirement has a stronger effect
than the tenure requirement on disincentivizing UI benefit applications and a negative
effect on the number of employers and on part-time jobs. The tenure requirement has
an opposite effect on the latter. The intuition for these results comes from the fact
that a tenure requirement does not influence workers to stay at the same job whereas
the monetary requirement incentivizes workers to keep high-paying jobs.
We calibrated the model to the US and conducted a series of counterfactual ex-
ercises by following a thought experiment that recovered the balance in the govern-
ment’s budget constraint. We were able to recover the negative correlation between
the monetary requirement and the employment outcomes and the associated positive
correlation with the tenure requirement. In the results of our exercises, we observe
that a stricter monetary requirement significantly reduces the share of workers enter-
ing the UI system that are not technically qualified to do so. On the other hand, the
tenure requirement has negligible numerical impact in labor market outcomes subject
to moral hazard.
We have maximized a utilitarian Social Welfare Function (SWF) on a restricted
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Ramsey problem and assessed the level of Consumption Equivalent Variation (CEV)
associated with the optimal parametric region for the tuple that characterizes the
program. In our results, we found that the highest level of welfare is achieved by a
monetary requirement when instruments are evaluated separately. A combination of
the tenure and the monetary requirement is able to achieve a higher level of welfare
than the coeteris paribus optimum.
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The time period used in our sample is from 1963 to 2016. The data on the labor mar-
ket is taken from the IPUMS source for the Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). All the data used regarding the
unemployment insurance law for the US states is taken from the US Department of
Labor (USDL). For the county-level data, we are able to identify respondents’ county
only after 1996. This restriction reduces significantly our sample of in terms of the
UI history and the events of introduction of requirements in some of the states. In
order to circunvent this issue we redefine our regional level to be on the border MSAs
or the ones that cross between states.
In our sample, each state has its own UI requirements conditionalities and proce-
dure for calculating UI eligibility and benefits. Several of them use a mix of monetary
and tenure requirement simultaneously. In order to have a common standard across
states and make the classification comparable, we identify as the tenure requirement
the minimum employment duration that would make a worker eligible and as the
monetary requirement the minimum weekly wage that make the worker eligible.
The source for this data are the USDL tables comparing UI state laws. The
standardization for the comparison through time is possible given some choices on the
references shown in the tables. The tenure requirement is somewhat straightforward
whereas the monetary requirement demands a finer definition. We take face value the
numbers shown in the tables for the states that have either a high quarter or a base
period definition or both. If there is no tabulation of any numbers, we consider the
rule to be absent. We transform these numbers for a weekly basis assuming that the
base period is the yearly total and divided it b 48 to recover the weekly equivalent.
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Whenever high quarter and base period are present we take the highest among them.
In earlier years where it was possible to find a specific weekly wage for some states,
we included the value and made the choice of the highest whenever there were other
reference periods.
We show the average of these quantities and the time series, respectively, for the
monetary requirement below in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 and for the tenure requirement in
Figures 2.7 and 2.8.
Figure 2.5: Minimum weekly wage in the US states used in the definition of the
monetary requirement.









































Figure 2.6: Time series from 1950 to 2016 of the minimum weekly wage in the US











Figure 2.7: Minimum number of weeks in the US states used in the definition of the
tenure requirement.









































Figure 2.8: Time series from 1950 to 2016 of the minimum number of weeks in the









2.A.2 Robustness of the Empirical Analysis
We show in this section a few tables containing different regressions for checking
the robustness of our empirical findings shown in the main text. First, we calculate
estimates using county as the region of observation in Table 2.6 below. We do not
find the same significance level across regressions and estimates as with our previous
choice. This is due to the fact that our panel is substantially longer when using the
MSA definition.
134
Table 2.6: Robustness of the econometric analysis at the county level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UI Last Year # Employers Last Year Part Time Duration Last Job
log(monreq) -0.00456 -0.0189** -0.0323* 0.434
(0.195) (0.012) (0.058) (0.203)
log(tenurereq) 0.00496 0.00505 0.0263* 0.230*
(0.154) (0.549) (0.062) (0.073)
Region County County County County
Border-Year FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
N 193712 135764 149407 1485
R2 0.017 0.040 0.073 0.439
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Note: The variable log is the logarithm of the numerical variable associated with the definition of tenure or monetary
requirement. Outcome variables for regressions (1), (3), (4) are dummies indicating the ocurrence of the variable in
the previous year. Outcome variable for regression (2) is numerical and continuous. The results are shown for the
coefficient of interest of a regression with control variables for demographic characteristics.
In our preferred specification in the main body of the text we have used an in-
dicator for the presence of the requirements in the results shown in Table 2.1. As
we have used a log formulation in the robustness checks shown in Table 2.6 for the
county-level observations, we use the same one for in Table 2.7 below:
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Table 2.7: Robustness of the econometric analysis at the MSA level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
UI Last Year # Employers Last Year Part Time Duration Last Job
log(monreq) 0.000237 0.00305 -0.00761 0.314
(0.887) (0.614) (0.244) (0.151)
log(tenurereq) 0.000159 0.0216*** 0.00858*** 0.662***
(0.887) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Region MSA MSA MSA MSA
Border-Year FE X X X X
Region FE X X X X
N 222656 111422 124584 1485
R2 0.899 0.052 0.086 0.336
p-values in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Note: The variable log is the logarithm of the numerical variable associated with the definition of tenure or monetary
requirement. Outcome variables for regressions (1), (3), (4) are dummies indicating the ocurrence of the variable in
the previous year. Outcome variable for regression (2) is numerical and continuous. The results are shown for the
coefficient of interest of a regression with control variables for demographic characteristics.
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